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REGULATION WITH PLACEBO EFFECTS 
ANUP MALANI† 
ABSTRACT 
  A growing scientific literature supports the existence of placebo 
effects from a wide range of health interventions and for a range of 
medical conditions. This Article reviews this literature, examines the 
implications for law and policy, and suggests future areas for research 
on placebo effects. In particular, it makes the case for altering the 
drug approval process to account for, if not credit, placebo effects. It 
recommends that evidence of placebo effects be permitted as a defense 
in cases alleging violations of informed consent or false advertising. 
Finally, it finds that tort law already has doctrines such as joint and 
several liability to account for placebo effects. Future research on 
placebo effects should focus on whether awareness of placebo effects 
can disable these effects and whether subjects can control their own 
placebo effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing scientific literature on the nature of placebo 
effects, which I define as the impact that individuals’ expectations 
about events (consumption of medication or other products, exposure 
to toxins, and so forth) have on their health outcomes following those 
events. According to the literature, placebo effects are not confined 
to so-called complementary and alternative therapies such as 
echinacea or biofeedback devices. Nor are they limited to contexts 
such as pain and depression, in which outcomes are typically 
subjectively measured. Placebo effects exist in a wide range of 
mainstream treatments for ailments with objectively measured harms, 
from treatments for ulcers and high cholesterol to interventions that 
affect blood pressure and mental acuity. 
The literature also finds that placebo effects have a physiological 
component. Individuals’ expectations about therapies alter their 
health outcomes not only by modifying their behavior in the period 
surrounding therapy, but also by triggering physiological (hormonal 
or neuronal, for instance) changes during that period. The available 
data suggests the existence both of positive placebo effects and of 
nocebo effects. By positive placebo effects I mean the traditional 
placebo effect: positive feelings about a therapy are associated with 
superior outcomes following that therapy. By nocebo effects I mean 
that expectations that a therapy has certain side effects make it more 
likely that those side effects will follow the therapy. Finally, the sort 
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of expectations about therapeutic efficacy that alter health outcomes 
can be triggered by a range of stimuli, from previous experience with 
a therapy to the price of a therapy. 
Although these findings have important implications for legal 
doctrine and regulatory policy, very little legal or policy literature on 
placebo effects exists.1 This Article attempts to fill the gap by 
addressing the question: how should the law regulate behavior when 
private agents’ expectations—about drugs, medical care, consumer 
products, and even other people’s behavior—affect their own health? 
To narrow my focus, I examine the four areas of law most likely to be 
impacted by evidence of placebo effects.2 
The field of law that placebo effects most directly affect is drug 
law. The data on placebo effects suggests that the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) should consider placebo and nocebo effects 
when deciding whether a drug is effective and safe, respectively. That 
is, in a placebo-controlled trial, if the placebo effects of a new drug 
are significantly greater than zero, then the FDA ought to deem the 
drug effective even if the same cannot be said about the 
pharmacological effects of the drug. If the drug also passes safety 
 
 1. For example, Russell Sobel has an advocacy piece which contends that the FDA ought 
to relax its requirement that drugs be pharmacologically effective and approve pure placebo 
therapies that are clinically proven to be effective. See Russell S. Sobel, Public Health and the 
Placebo: The Legacy of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act, 3 CATO J. 465, 472–77 (2002). 
Professors Kathleen Boozang and John Thomas have taken up the question of whether the use 
of pure placebo therapies is compatible with informed consent. See Kathleen Boozang, The 
Therapeutic Placebo: The Case for Patient Deception, 54 FLA. L. REV. 687, 731–46 (2002); W. 
John Thomas, Informed Consent, the Placebo Effect, and the Revenge of Thomas Percival, 22 J. 
LEGAL MED. 313 passim (2001). More broadly, Amitai Aviram examines whether laws 
themselves can have placebo effects. See Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s 
Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 77–102 (2006). In other words, 
can public safety laws change private agents’ expectations in a way that modifies their welfare in 
a manner distinct from the direct incentive or distributive effects of the laws? That is a very 
interesting question, but it is distinct from the question this Article addresses, namely, how 
should laws regulate placebo effects not caused by the law? 
 2. This Article is also related to the extensive behavioral law and economics literature 
that Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein’s seminal 1998 paper sparked. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471 (1998). One similarity is that the placebo effect, like many findings in the behavioral 
economics and psychology literature, poses a challenge to the assumptions of the neoclassical 
economic model of human behavior. See Anup Malani, Identifying Placebo Effects with Data 
from Clinical Trials, 114 J. POL. ECON. 236, 237 (2006) (suggesting that placebo effects challenge 
the independence axiom). The difference is the challenge to the neoclassical model is not so 
serious that the model can no longer guide legal regulation. All that may be required is a 
modification of the conventional wisdom about how health is produced, the consequences of 
information, and causation. 
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review, then it should be approved. To facilitate consideration of 
placebo effects in approval decisions, the FDA might consider a slight 
tweak to its regulation of Phase III trials. The FDA requires that drug 
companies conduct two independent clinical trials to demonstrate 
that a new drug is effective. It ought to require that the two trials, if 
blinded, have different probabilities of assigning trial subjects to 
treatment. This difference would generate differences in expectations 
(about the probability of receiving treatment) among subjects and 
these differences may be used to estimate the placebo effects of new 
drugs. Finally, because placebo effects are driven by expectations 
about drugs and expectations about drugs may change over time, it is 
important that the FDA conduct postapproval marketing surveys to 
determine whether the placebo or nocebo effects of a drug warrant 
reconsidering the labeling and perhaps approval of a drug. 
A second legal field significantly impacted by the findings 
regarding placebo effects is health law. For instance, there are 
implications for informed consent. Here, the central question is 
whether doctors should be required to inform subjects that they are 
employing a placebo for therapeutic purposes. The answer depends 
on whether informing patients about placebo effects defeats those 
effects. One cannot be certain, but some research suggests it does. If 
that research is correct, states have to weigh the value of placebo 
therapy against the cost to personal autonomy. Unless a physician has 
a financial interest in prescribing placebo effects, however, it does not 
seem there is a serious risk that doctors will abuse this privilege. 
Another question is whether placebo effects have consequences for 
medical malpractice. For example, may a doctor be held liable for 
malpractice for employing a placebo therapy that has side effects 
(that is, is a nocebo), or for using a pure placebo as a substitute for 
treatment with positive pharmacological effects? My view is that a 
doctor should be held liable for such actions, though substantive 
analysis of the claim ought not to be affected by whether the therapy 
operates by modifying expectations or by pharmacology. 
A third field that is affected by placebo effects is consumer 
protection law. This field encompasses claims of fraud through 
misrepresentation or false advertising by sellers of products not 
otherwise regulated by the FDA. Two questions might arise: Can a 
seller use otherwise unsubstantiated health claims to generate 
placebo effects from its product? Can a seller advertise claims based 
on the substantiated placebo effects of its product? Currently the law 
prohibits both behaviors. But this prohibition reduces the potential 
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for consumers to realize valuable placebo effects. Unless there are 
unintended harmful consequences from generating placebo effects, a 
more prudent rule would allow defendants to offer evidence of 
placebo effects as a defense to fraud or false advertising. 
A fourth legal field that is impacted by placebo effects—actually 
nocebo effects—is tort law. Who should bear losses due to nocebo 
effects? By nocebo effects I mean injury that is the result not of the 
defendant’s actions but of the plaintiff’s fears about the harms that 
flow from those actions. The answer depends on whether the plaintiff 
can control those fears or the consequences that flow from them. If 
so, standard tort rules concerning victim precaution, such as 
comparative negligence and mitigation, rightfully control. If not, 
there may be a third party that has contributed to the plaintiff’s belief 
and therefore might be joined to the litigation. Often joinder is not 
feasible. In that case, and when the harms from nocebo effects are 
indistinguishable from harms attributable to the defendant’s action, it 
is natural to rely on the existing doctrine of joint and several liability. 
The result is that the available defendant bears the losses due to 
nocebo effects because of the possibility that the third party cannot 
be found. Even when joint and several liability technically does not 
apply, it may be reasonable for the defendant to bear the loss when it 
could have provided the plaintiff with information—advertising—to 
offset fears about the defendant’s product or actions. An added 
benefit of this approach is that it requires little reform, or even 
recognition of nocebo effects, by the tort system. 
Part I of this Article reviews the scientific literature on placebo 
effects. Part II examines the implications the current understanding of 
placebo effects has for drug law, health law, consumer protection law, 
and tort law. 
I.  WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT PLACEBO EFFECTS? 
There is an extensive literature on placebo effects. A search of 
the medical database PubMed for “placebo effect[s]” yields 3424 hits 
since 1953.3 The same search in the psychology database PsycINFO, 
 
 3. The precise search was (“placebo effect” or “placebo effects”). There were 573 hits for 
“placebo effect” or “placebo effects” in the title of an article, using the search ((“placebo 
effects” [Title]) OR (“placebo effect” [Title])). PubMed does not gather citations prior to 1949. 
See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., FAQ: MEDLINE Citations Prior to 1949, http://www. 
nlm.nih.gov/services/oldmed.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2008). 
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which has limited overlap with PubMed, yields 648 hits.4 These 
numbers, however, overstate how much is known about placebo 
effects. In part that is because much of the previous scholarship has 
focused on placebo effects related to pain and psychological 
disorders.5 Most other ailment-treatment combinations have received 
scant or no attention. In part this limited understanding is due to 
methodological weaknesses in studies of placebo effects. 
For instance, studies rarely begin with a precise model of 
cognition or definition of placebo effects so that investigators can 
accurately design their trials and consider the implications of their 
findings.6 Studies frequently employ subjective measures of outcomes, 
such as self-assessments of wellbeing.7 These assessments may simply 
regurgitate expectations rather than demonstrate changes in objective 
outcomes. They may also reflect what the investigator wants to hear 
rather than the subject’s “true” health state. Studies are rarely 
designed to have externally valid implications. They may modify 
expectations—with puffery or even direct misstatements8—in a 
manner that others probably cannot replicate outside of a trial. It is 
hard to draw policy-relevant conclusions from such analyses. Finally, 
many studies do not provide very “clean” tests of placebo effects 
because they fail to control for behaviors that may confound results. 
An example is Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s oft-cited meta-analysis of 
114 studies with a blinded treatment, blinded placebo and unblinded 
 
 4. The search was (“placebo effect” or “placebo effects”) in any field at 
http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=main.landing (restricted access) (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). 
 5. A large fraction of these articles focus on placebo effects in pain and a sizable portion 
focus on depression. In PubMed, for example, 736 of the 3424 placebo effect articles were on 
“pain,” “analgesia” or “analgesic,” using the search ((“placebo effect” or “placebo effects”) 
AND (“pain” or “analgesia” or “analgesic”)), and 274 were on “depression,” using the search 
((“placebo effect” or “placebo effects”) AND (“depression”)). 
 6. An exception is my study examining placebo effects in clinical trials, Malani, supra note 
2, at 237, 240–44, though in that study I use an extremely simplistic model and make convenient 
assumptions (linear effects of expectation on outcomes) to justify my empirical model, see id. at 
238–39, 242. 
 7. See, e.g., Eva Skovlund, Letter to the Editor, Should We Tell Trial Patients That They 
Might Receive Placebo?, 337 LANCET 1041, 1041 (1991) (reporting that self-reported pain on a 
10cm visual analogue scale (VAS) was lower in both arms of a trial of paracetemol for 
postpartum uterine cramping that employed a placebo control than in a trial of the same 
treatment and ailment than employed a naproxen control). 
 8. See, e.g., Antonella Pollo et al., Response Expectancies in Placebo Analgesia and Their 
Clinical Relevance, 93 PAIN 77, 78 (2001) (describing how differing verbal instructions in natural 
history, classic double-blind administration, and deceptive administrations of anesthesia clinical 
trials had a significant effect on patient behavior and opiod intake). 
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no-treatment arm.9 The authors compare health outcomes in the 
blinded placebo and unblinded no-treatment arms to determine 
whether placebos improve health outcomes. They largely find no 
difference between the arms and conclude that placebo effects do not 
exist.10 The problem is that subjects in the no-treatment arms know 
they are not being treated and therefore may seek out alternative 
treatment that elevates their outcomes. This makes the placebo arms 
seem relatively less effective. 
In this Part, I review and synthesize the literature on placebo 
effects. My objective is not to summarize every study, but to highlight 
those studies that have relatively sound methodologies and are 
among the more probative about the nature of placebo effects. I also 
identify research questions that are relevant to law and policy making 
but have yet to be addressed. Throughout, my discussion focuses on 
placebo effects defined as a change in health outcomes following 
treatment that is due to a patient’s expectation about the value of that 
treatment.11 
A. Nonalternative Medications Have Placebo Effects 
A common piece of folk wisdom, based on my experience, on 
placebo effects is that they are isolated to complementary and 
alternative medications, such as echinacea, acupuncture, St. Johns 
wort, or biofeedback devices. A second piece of folk wisdom is that 
placebo effects are generally confined to pain medications or anti-
depressants,12 for which outcomes are subjectively measured.13 Both 
 
 9. Asbjørn Hróbjartsson & Peter C. Gøtzsche, Is the Placebo Powerless? An Analysis of 
Clinical Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1594, 1594–602 
(2001). 
 10. Id. at 1594 (finding no difference in binary outcomes and a slight difference in 
continuous outcomes). 
 11. This review ignores Hawthorne effects, which are improvements attributable to a 
doctor’s attention or a change in the treatment environment rather than the treatment itself, see 
Stephen R.G. Jones, Was There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 451, 457 (1992), and what I 
call the red pill/blue pill effect, which are improvements due to the physical form of the 
treatment as opposed to the pharmacological content of that treatment. The intuition behind 
the policy implication of placebo effects may be used to derive the policy implications for 
Hawthorne and red pill/blue pill effects. 
 12. For an example of depression studies, see Helen S. Mayberg et al., The Functional 
Neuroanatomy of the Placebo Effect, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 728, 729 (2002). A potential flaw 
in these studies is that they infer placebo effects from the fact that the placebo control group of 
a blinded randomized trial display signs of improvement. But the improvement could be due to 
natural history (or even the Hawthorne effect, that is, the additional attention subjects receive 
when in a clinical trial). 
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views are incorrect. In fact, there is very little evidence on placebo 
effects from alternative medications.14 And meaningful data suggest 
that placebo effects exist with respect to not just pain medications (an 
example of which I shall give in a moment) but also treatments for 
other ailments. 
One of the better studies on the placebo effects from analgesia is 
Pollo et al.’s 2001 study on the behavior of postoperative patients in 
Italy.15 This study enrolled thirty-eight patients recovering from 
thoracic surgery for lung cancer in the surgery ward of a hospital.16 
For purposes of pain relief, they were given an unknown solution 
(actually saline) via intravenous (IV) drip and permitted to request 
supplemental doses of buprenorphine, a weaker cousin of morphine.17 
Patients were randomized into three treatment groups. One group 
was told nothing about the analgesic effect of the saline IV (natural 
history group).18 The second group was told that the saline IV was 
either a powerful painkiller or a placebo (double-blind placebo 
group).19 The third group was told the saline IV was a potent 
painkiller (deceptive placebo group).20 The investigators measured 
two outcomes: the number of doses of buprenorphine requested, and 
self-reports of pain intensity. The study made two important findings. 
First, the deceptive placebo group requested less buprenorphine than 
the double-blind placebo group, which in turn requested less than the 
natural history group.21 Second, all three groups self-reported roughly 
the same level of pain intensity.22 Figure 1 of this Article illustrates 
these findings.23 
This study is probative because it did not rely purely on self-
reports to measure pain. It also looked to behavior (the lack of 
 
 13. See, e.g., Lene Vase, Joseph L. Riley III & Donald D. Price, A Comparison of Placebo 
Effects in Clinical Analgesic Trials Versus Studies of Placebo Analgesia, 99 PAIN 443, 446 tbl.2 
(2002) (indicating the wide use of self-reports, such as the Visual Analog Scale instrument, as a 
pain measure).  
 14. See Franklin G. Miller et al., Ethical Issues Concerning Research in Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 599, 603–04 (2004). 
 15. Pollo et al., supra note 8, at 78. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 80. 
 22. Id. at 78. 
 23. Figure 1 of this Article reproduces Figure 4 from the original study. See id. at 81 fig.4. 
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requests for additional painkiller) on the theory that it is what 
economists call a revealed preference.24 A weakness of this approach 
is that one cannot rule out that requests for buprenorphine may 
simply reflect the self-reports and not measure pain any more deeply 
than those reports. Nevertheless, the study implies that investigators 
suggesting pain relief from a saline drip yields subjective, and perhaps 
objective, reduction in pain. Interestingly, the double-blind group 
experienced roughly half the “pain relief” that the deceptive placebo 
group received,25 as might be expected from an equal-probability 
assignment to placebo or analgesia. This finding points toward a 
model of placebo effects on which the next study of placebo effects 
can build. Moreover, the design of the Pollo et al. study implies that 
the investigators’ suggestion was equivalent to the administration of 
four additional doses (mg) of buprenorphine over seventy hours.26 In 
other words, the study has some predictive value: it assigned a value 
to the investigator’s instruction that has meaning outside the study 
context. 
A second study that is probative of the scope of placebo effects is 
my 2006 meta-analysis of double-blind trials of ulcer medications and 
trials of cholesterol-lowering drugs.27 That study compared subjects in 
trials in which everyone received active treatment to trials in which 
half of subjects received active treatment and half received placebo 
control.28 Subjects in the former trials thought the probability of 
receiving active treatment was 100 percent, whereas subjects in the 
latter trials thought the probability was just 50 percent. Subjects 
actually given active treatment in both sets of trials, however, had the 
same pharmacological treatment. All that differed between them was 
expectations. The study found that subjects given active treatment in 
the former trials exhibited better medical outcomes than subjects 
given active treatment in the latter trials.29 That study makes two 
contributions to the understanding of placebo effects. First, the study 
demonstrated placebo effects for nonalternative medications and for 
ailments with objective outcomes.30 The two antiulcer medications 
 
 24. STANLEY BOBER, ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 83 (2001). 
 25. See Pollo et al., supra note 8, at 80 fig.2. 
 26. See id. at 80 fig.3. 
 27. See Malani, supra note 2, at 239. 
 28. Id. at 238–39. 
 29. Id. at 247–49. 
 30. Id. at 253. 
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examined were H2-blockers, such as Zantac and Tagamet, and proton 
pump inhibitors (PPIs), such as Prilosec.31 The main ulcer outcome 
was healing of ulcers, which was verified by endoscopy. The 
cholesterol trials examined various statins, including atorvastatin, sold 
under the brand name Lipitor, and simvastatin, sold as Zocor.32 The 
main outcome was the level of low-density lipoproteins (LDL)—the 
“bad” cholesterol in the blood—which was verified by blood screens.33 
Second, the study employed a simple model of trial subjects’ beliefs to 
nondeceptively manipulate expectations and generate externally valid 
predictions about the magnitude of placebo effects.34 The intuition, 
which built on Pollo et al.’s findings, is simple. Blinding in a 
randomized control trial holds constant subjects’ expectations about 
their treatment assignment.35 So when one compares the treatment 
arm to the placebo-control arm of a given trial, one observes the 
pharmacological effect of the studied treatment. The insight of my 
design is that if one has two different blinded trials with different 
probabilities of assignment to treatment and compares the treatment 
arm of one trial to the treatment arm of the other, one is holding 
constant the pharmacological agent but manipulating the expectation 
of subjects. If there were placebo effects, one would expect that 
outcomes in the treatment arm of the higher-probability-of-treatment 
trial would be superior to outcomes in the treatment arm of the 
lower-probability trial.36 
This is exactly what the study found. A summary table of the 
results is presented in Figure 5.37 Comparing, for simplicity, H2-
blocker (versus placebo) trials in which 50 percent of subjects are 
 
 31. H2-blockers, also known as H2-receptor antagonists, and proton pump inhibitors reduce 
the production of acid by parietal cells in the stomach. See BERTRAM G. KATZUNG, BASIC & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 263 (10th ed. 2006). 
 32. Statins inhibit the enzyme HMG-CoA reductase and thereby increase the rate at which 
the liver clears low-density lipoproteins from the bloodstream. There are many different types 
of statins, such as atorvastatin, simvastatin, and lovastatin. See Stefanie Dimmeler et al., HMG-
CoA Reductase-Inhibitors (Statins) Increase Endothelial Progenitor Cells via the PI 3-Kinase/Akt 
Pathway, 108 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 391, 391–92 (2001). 
 33. LDL levels above 160 mg/dl increase the risk of developing atherosclerosis, which may 
cause stroke, heart failure, and loss of limbs. See Jeanette Curtis & Caroline Rea, WebMD, 
LDL (Low-Density Lipoprotein) Cholesterol, http://www.webmd.com/hw-popup/ldl-low-
density-lipoprotein-cholesterol (last visited on Oct. 24, 2008). 
 34. Malani, supra note 2, at 239. 
 35. See Simon J. Day & Douglas G. Altman, Blinding in Clinical Trials and Other Studies, 
321 BRIT. MED. J. 504, 504 (2000). 
 36. For a methodological critique, see text accompanying infra note 138. 
 37. This reproduces Table 1 from the original study. See Malani, supra note 2, at 239 tbl.1. 
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treated with ones in which 100 percent of subjects are treated, the 
fraction of subjects whose ulcers healed was 11 percent higher in the 
100 percent-treated trials. Because the total expectation effect from 
consuming a drug outside the trial context was going from an 
expectation of 0 percent (certain of no treatment) to 100 percent 
(certain of treatment), the placebo effect was roughly double the 11 
percent number, or 22 percent. Depending on the specific H2-blocker 
at issue, this finding implies that placebo effects are 31 to 213 percent 
the size of pharmacological effects.38 The same analysis with statins 
(versus placebo) trials suggests that 100 percent trials lower LDL (the 
“bad” cholesterol) levels 14.6 mg/dll more than 50 percent trials. This 
finding implies a placebo effect of nearly 30 mg/dll or up to 70 percent 
the size of the pharmacological effects of these drugs.39 
Later in this Part, I also provide evidence of placebo effects in 
the context of caffeine on blood pressure and of energy drinks on 
mental acuity.40 Although I do not highlight them, a number of recent 
studies have examined placebo effects with respect to the motor 
functions of patients with Parkinson’s disease41 and some other 
ailment-treatment combinations.42 That said, there are many more 
such combinations that have not been examined for placebo effects 
than those that have. Given that placebo effects may have nontrivial 
impacts relative to pharmacological effects, the yield from exploring 
placebo effects in other contexts could be quite high. 
Importantly, there are no serious studies—and thus no 
evidence—of placebo effects outside the therapeutic context. One 
might wonder, however, whether there are nocebo effects due to 
silicon breast implants, microwave emissions from cell phones, 
electromagnetic fields from power lines, consumption of spinach 
 
 38. See id. at 252 tbl.6. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See infra notes 70–77, 103–08 and accompanying text. 
 41. Parkinson’s disease is a degenerative condition of the central nervous system that 
impairs one’s speech and motor skills. See THOMAS FOLTYNIE, PARKINSON’S DISEASE: YOUR 
QUESTIONS ANSWERED 3, 11, 34 (2003). For studies on placebo effects in Parkinson’s patients, 
see, for example, Raúl de la Fuente-Fernández et al., Expectation and Dopamine Release: 
Mechanism of the Placebo Effect in Parkinson’s Disease, 293 SCIENCE 1164, 1164 (2001); Raúl 
de la Fuente-Fernández & A. Jon Stoessl, The Placebo Effect in Parkinson’s Disease, 25 
TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCE 302, 302 (2002); Felipe Fregni et al., Immediate Placebo Effect in 
Parkinson’s Disease—Is the Subjective Relief Accompanied by Objective Improvement?, 56 EUR. 
NEUROLOGY 222, 222 (2006); Christopher G. Goetz et al., Objective Changes in Motor Function 
During Placebo Treatment in PD, 54 NEUROLOGY 710, 710 (2000). 
 42. For a convenient list and citations, see Sobel, supra note 1, at 474 & tbl.2. 
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during an E. coli43 scare, and so on. In many of these cases, anecdotal 
accounts have described health costs, but more rigorous studies have 
found no pharmacological effects or have proved inconclusive.44 The 
usual way to reconcile the inconsistency between anecdotal evidence 
and systematic evidence is to attribute the anecdotal accounts to 
unrelated background noise. An alternative approach, however, 
would be to explore whether health costs are driven by expectation of 
adverse effects. In general, systematic studies into the consequences 
of, for example, breast implants or power lines are designed, like most 
clinical trials, to isolate pharmacological effects, not placebo effects.45 
The problem, even with systematic observational studies that explore 
all effects by comparing, for example, women with and without 
implants or neighborhoods close to and far away from power lines, is 
that selection bias may confound accurate estimation of placebo 
effects.46 
I do not contend that it would be easy to design a study to 
explore the effect of expectation on adverse events in a 
nontherapeutic context. The most promising approach is likely event 
analysis. For example, one might explore the effect that a prominent 
news report on health hazards from a product had on the rate of that 
health hazard among consumers of that product or the population at 
large following the report. But even this approach has important 
limitations. The most significant is that any spike in adverse events 
could be due to changes in the rate of diagnosing or reporting of these 
events, not in the rate of events themselves. Yet the value of this 
 
 43. E. coli, short for Escherichia coli, is a bacteria commonly found in the small intestine. 
Most strains are harmless, but some cause serious food poisoning. PHYLLIS ENTIS, FOOD 
SAFETY: OLD HABITS, NEW PERSPECTIVES 89, 134 (2007). 
 44. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 112–13 (2000); J.E. 
Moulder et al., Cell Phones and Cancer: What Is the Evidence for a Connection?, 151 
RADIATION RES. 513, 513 (1999). 
 45. See INST. OF MED., supra note 44, at 1–12; MARK MONMONIE, CARTOGRAPHIES OF 
DANGER: MAPPING HAZARDS IN AMERICA 186–92 (1997). 
 46. Whereas experimental studies randomly assign subjects to treatment and control 
groups, observational studies allow subjects (usually in the real world) to choose whether to 
take treatment or the control and then observe the outcomes of subjects. The disadvantage of 
observational studies is that subjects who choose treatment may differ in some unobservable 
ways from subjects who choose the control. Thus the difference in outcomes across treatment 
and control either could be due to the treatment or due to these unobservable differences. 
Randomly assigning subjects to treatment and control statistically eliminates these unobservable 
differences. The disadvantage of randomized experiments is that they may not be externally 
valid because, in the real world, treatment choices are rarely made by coin flip. Observational 
studies do not suffer this flaw. 
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information to regulation may justify the effort despite its 
imprecision. After all, noisy or biased information can be more 
valuable than no information at all. 
B. Placebo Effects Have a Physiological Mechanism 
An important weakness of my study, other than the fact that it 
performed a meta-analysis that synthesized the results from trials 
conducted by other researchers rather than conducting a new trial,47 is 
that it did not explore the causal pathway for the placebo effects it 
identified. Broadly speaking there are two possible pathways: 
behavioral and physiological. In the former case, changes in 
expectation modify a subject’s behavior in a way that improves health 
outcomes. For example, a subject in a trial with a higher probability 
of getting H2-blockers may be more likely to avoid the stress or spicy 
food that might contribute to an ulcer.48 This is a placebo effect 
because the investigator does not observe the behavioral change. All 
the investigator observes is a change in expectation and then a change 
in outcomes, a pattern consistent with placebo effects. In case of a 
physiological pathway, changes in expectation cause physiological 
changes within the body. For example, the bodies of subjects in the 
higher-probability H2-blocker trial could begin to produce lower 
levels of stomach acid or increase the rate at which stomach lining is 
produced. 
There are two difficulties with the concept of behavioral placebo 
effects. First, it is not the popular conception of placebo effects. The 
popular conception is along the lines of the physiological placebo 
effects: hidden connections between the central nervous system and 
the immune system or erstwhile independently run organs.49 Hence, 
one often sees terms like “mind-body interactions” connected with 
 
 47. The negative implication is that there might be subtle differences in the clinical trials 
that are inputs into the meta-analysis that might reduce the precision of the analysis or, worse, 
explain some of the results. I explore but rule out, for example, the possibility of self-selection 
of subjects into trials explaining my results. See Malani, supra note 2, at 242–45. 
 48. It is true that the bacteria H. pylori is now thought to cause most cases of gastric ulcers. 
However, that new conventional wisdom is being challenged by recent research. See Shyam 
Varadarajulu & James W. Freston, Helicobacter Pylori-Negative Peptic Ulcer Disease, 
UPTODATE, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.uptodateonline.com/patients/content/topic.do?topicKey= 
~sNN2bmT1TMaQEP. 
 49. See, e.g., Gustavo Pacheco-López et al., Expectations and Associations That Heal: 
Immunomodulatory Placebo Effects and Its Neurobiology, 20 BRAIN BEHAV. & IMMUNITY 430, 
435–41 (2006). 
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placebo studies.50 The problem with the popular conception is that 
many studies, such as mine, have failed to rule out hidden behavior as 
an explanation for placebo effects. A second difficulty with 
behavioral placebo effects is that it can “vanish” once the investigator 
observes or controls for the responsible behavior. I do not view this 
“vanishing” as a problem because, in the real world, consumption of 
therapy can have both pharmacological effects and behavioral 
effects.51 The latter are driven by expectation, whether or not 
observed. And they have real health consequences that ought to be 
considered when estimating the full value of the therapy. 
Two questions still remain. First, why distinguish between 
behavioral placebo effects and physiological placebo effects? Second, 
is there any evidence of physiological placebo effects? The reason to 
distinguish the two types of placebo effect is that they may have 
different implications for legal regulation. I explore this further in 
Part II. But the crucial point is that one might suspect that behavioral 
placebo effects are more likely to be under the control of the patient 
(or tort victim as the case may be) than physiological placebo effects. 
Therefore, behavioral placebo effects might be more susceptible to 
incentives than physiological placebo effects. 
With regard to the second question, the answer is that growing 
evidence shows that placebo effects have a physiological component. 
Consider two important sets of pain studies. The first set, which 
includes a classic study by Levine, Gordon, and Fields52 and more 
recent studies by Amanzio and Benedetti53 and Benedetti, Arduino, 
and Amanzio,54 examines the effect of naloxone on placebo-induced 
analgesia. Naloxone is a drug used to treat, for example, morphine 
overdose. It blocks the bonding of opioids, whether made by the body 
or not (like morphine, heroin, or methadone), to certain opioid 
 
 50. See, e.g., Damien G. Finniss & Fabrizio Benedetti, Mechanisms of the Placebo 
Response and Their Impact on Clinical Trials and Clinical Practice, 114 PAIN 3, 3, 5, 6 (2005). 
 51. For example, joint pain might stop me from typing this manuscript. If I take ibuprofen, 
I experience a pharmacological effect (the blocking of pain receptors) and a behavioral effect (I 
can return to typing). 
 52. Jon D. Levine, Newton C. Gordon & Howard L. Fields, The Mechanism of Placebo 
Analgesia, LANCET, Sept. 23, 1978, at 654, 654–57. 
 53. Martina Amanzio & Fabrizio Benedetti, Neuropharmacological Dissection of Placebo 
Analgesia: Expectation-Activated Opioid Systems Versus Conditioning-Activated Specific 
Subsystems, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 484, 484 (1999). 
 54. Fabrizio Benedetti, Claudia Arduino & Martina Amanzio, Somatotopic Activation of 
Opioid Systems by Target-Directed Expectations of Analgesia, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3639, 3639 
(1999). 
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receptors, which in turn block the sensation of pain.55 In other words, 
naloxone negates the effect of certain analgesics. Researchers 
conducting the naloxone studies used different methodologies but 
typically employed investigator suggestion to generate pain relief 
from the placebo.56 (In other words, subjects were given an inert 
treatment like a saline drip but deceptively told by the investigator 
that it was a powerful painkiller.) The important finding from the 
naloxone studies is that administration of naloxone reverses the pain 
relief from the placebo.57 The implication is that placebo analgesics 
must operate, at least in part, by generating endogenous opioids that 
bond with certain opioid receptors.58 Thus analgesic placebo effects 
have a physiological mechanism of action. 
One drawback of the naloxone studies is that some evidence 
indicates that naloxone may not only block opioid receptors but also 
independently generate pain.59 Thus, one cannot readily infer that 
placebo analgesics operate by stimulating endogenous opioid 
production. A second class of studies addressed this concern by 
showing that subjects given placebo analgesia experience a 
neurological response similar to that experienced by subjects treated 
with real analgesia. The innovation of these studies was to employ 
neuroimaging devices such as positron emission tomography (PET)60 
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to detect changes 
in neuronal (that is, electrical) activity accompanying placebo 
 
 55. More technically, opioid receptors block the firing of neurons from nociceptors. 
Alistair D. Corbett et al., 75 Years of Opioid Research: The Exciting but Vain Quest for the Holy 
Grail, 147 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY S153, S153–54 (2006). It is the transfer of neurons from 
nociceptors located throughout the body to the brain that generates what is known as pain. 
Soc’y for Neuroscience, Nociceptors and Pain, http://www.sfn.org/index.cfm?pagename= 
brainbriefings_nociceptorsandpain (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). Opioid receptors come in three 
classes, μ, κ and δ, Corbett et al., supra, at S153; naloxone is thought to block mainly μ-opioid 
receptors, see G. EDWARD MORGAN, CLINICAL ANESTHESIOLOGY 249 (2001). Hence placebo 
analgesics too are thought to operate on this class of receptors. 
 56. This suggestion is usually done through behavior. See, e.g., Benedetti et al., supra note 
54, at 3639 (using the application of a placebo, that is, inert, cream to the subject’s limbs). 
 57. See Amanzio & Benedetti, supra note 53, at 484, 493; Benedetti et al., supra note 54, at 
3639; Levine et al., supra note 52, at 654–55. 
 58. See, e.g., Benedetti et al., supra note 54, at 3639. 
 59. Specifically it causes hyperalgesia, or extreme sensitivity to pain. See Richard H. 
Gracely et al., Placebo and Naloxone Can Alter Post-Surgical Pain by Separate Mechanisms, 306 
NATURE 264, 264 (1983). 
 60. See Jon-Kar Zubieta et al., Placebo Effects Mediated by Endogenous Opioid Activity on 
μ-Opioid Receptors, 25 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7754, 7754 (2005). 
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analgesia.61 The methodology is similar to the naloxone studies. For 
example, in the Wager et al. study, pain was artificially generated by 
administering local electric shock or heat to each subject’s wrist.62 
Initially investigators applied a placebo cream to each subject’s wrist 
but told the subjects it was a mild analgesic (treatment state).63 The 
cream was removed.64 Later, investigators reapplied the same placebo 
cream but told subjects it was in fact a placebo (control state).65 The 
main finding was that the placebo analgesic activates the same regions 
of the brain that actual analgesics are known to activate.66 
The main drawback of the brain scan studies is that, because the 
neurophysiology of pain is not fully understood,67 it is uncertain 
whether brain scans reveal mere correlates of pain reduction or the 
causal mechanisms behind pain reduction. For example, it is not 
known whether (a) the changes in neuronal activity are the brain 
anticipating or realizing there might be or was pain reduction, or (b) 
the activity is itself reduction in pain sensation. The first view would 
suggest mere correlation, the second, causation. That said, I believe 
that one day soon nonplacebo studies of the neurophysiology of pain 
sensation will be able to determine the proper view. If it is the second 
view, then the brain scan studies will prove compelling. 
Outside the pain context, only a small number of studies have 
examined the physiology of placebo effects. For example, Mayberg et 
al. explored physiological placebo effects from fluoxetine (Prozac) on 
patients with depression.68 But the methodology is again brain (PET) 
scans, raising the same questions about causation as did the pain 
studies.69 Malani and Houser explored physiological placebo effects 
from caffeine on blood pressure in healthy patients.70 Our approach 
was different, though it has its own limitations. 
 
 61. Tor D. Wager et al., Placebo-Induced Changes in fMRI in the Anticipation and 
Experience of Pain, 303 SCIENCE 1162, 1162 (2004). 
 62. See id. at 1162–64. 
 63. Id. at 1163 fig.1. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 1165. 
 67. L.G.F. GILES, 50 CHALLENGING SPINAL PAIN SYNDROME CASES 1 (Heidi Allen ed., 
2003). 
 68. Mayberg et al., supra note 12, at 728–29. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Anup Malani & Daniel Houser, Expectations Mediate Objective Physiological Placebo 
Effects, in 20 NEUROECONOMICS: ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES 
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We employed a crossover trial design71 in which each subject was 
exposed to three treatments to generate placebo effects.72 The first 
treatment was that subjects were randomly assigned, with equal 
probability, to either caffeine or placebo, but not told which 
treatment they received. (Subjects were exposed to this treatment 
twice—that is, they were twice randomly assigned to caffeine or 
placebo but blinded to their assignment.) The second treatment was 
unblinded administration of a caffeine pill. The third was unblinded 
administration of a placebo pill. The outcomes measured were 
diastolic and systolic blood pressure. Our hypothesis was that, if there 
are positive placebo effects from caffeine, then blood pressure should 
be highest when subjects are given unblinded caffeine because they 
are experiencing both the pharmacological effect of caffeine plus the 
full expectation that they are receiving caffeine. The second-highest 
blood pressure should be observed after blinded caffeine; subjects get 
the pharmacological effect of caffeine, but only half the expectation 
effect because they know there is only a one in two chance of 
receiving caffeine. Following the same logic, the third- and fourth-
highest blood pressure readings should be taken after administration 
of the blinded placebo and unblinded placebo, respectively. As the 
reader might guess, this was exactly what is observed, as shown in 
Figure 3 (diastolic and systolic blood pressure, respectively). 
But so far this design appears merely to be an extension of the 
Malani study, which also used the probability of treatment in blinded 
trials to manipulate expectation,73 with the minor variation that the 
treatment and outcome were caffeine and blood pressure. The 
valuable innovation, however, is that the subjects in the Malani and 
Houser study were required to remain seated while reading airline 
magazine articles.74 In other words, the behavior of each subject was 
held constant. Therefore, the observed placebo effect was likely due 
 
RESEARCH (Daniel Houser & Kevin McCabe eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 8, 10, on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
 71. In a crossover trial, each subject receives both the treatment and the control, first one, 
then the other. See BYRON JONES & MICHAEL G. KENWARD, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF 
CROSS-OVER TRIALS 1 (2d ed. 2003). The part that is randomized is whether a subject receives 
treatment first or control first. See id. By contrast, in a parallel-armed trial, each subject receives 
either treatment or control, but not both. See id.; see also Malani, supra note 2, at 245. 
 72. See Malani & Houser, supra note 70 (manuscript at 8–9). 
 73. Malani, supra note 2, at 236, 238–40. 
 74. Malani & Houser, supra note 70 (manuscript at 9). The logic was that standing modifies 
blood pressure and that airlines choose the content of their magazines to keep their passengers’ 
attention but not excite them. Id. 
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to physiological changes within subjects rather than behavioral 
changes by subjects over the course of different treatments. 
The limitation of our study is that it sheds no light on the nature 
of the physiological response. In our defense, it would be hard to do 
so without interfering with the physiological response—a rough 
analog of the observer effect.75 To determine, for example, the 
hormones that mediated the placebo effect on blood pressure would 
likely require either urinalysis or blood tests, but such interventions 
are likely to themselves modify blood pressure.76 Indeed, this observer 
effect is also a problem with the brain scans. Putting an individual 
inside an MRI machine may interact with the neuronal activity that 
one is attempting to study. One might observe a before placebo/after 
placebo change in activity, but it may not be the same change one 
would observe outside the study context. Therefore, studies of the 
physiological mechanism may have limited external validity.77 
From a policy perspective, the literature significantly fails to 
resolve whether this type of placebo effect is subject to patients’ 
conscious control. Specifically, can people choose to believe that a 
therapy will or will not alter their health outcomes, whether in a 
positive or negative direction? (Another way to put this is: are the 
beliefs that trigger placebo effects endogenous?) Alternatively, can 
people “disconnect” their beliefs about the effect of a therapy from 
health outcomes following that therapy? That is, can people simply 
turn off or negate placebo effects? In the case of behavioral placebo 
effects, the answer to at least the second inquiry is: to some extent, 
yes. If a person who believes a therapy is likely to work takes actions 
to complement that therapy, those actions are said to be voluntary or 
conscious. One could give the person incentives to take more or fewer 
of those actions. It would be useful to know whether that is also true 
for physiological placebo effects. Until the answer is known, I 
proceed in this Article assuming—as I think most readers do—that 
 
 75. In other words, the observer affects the observed. See IMMY HOLLOWAY, BASIC 
CONCEPTS FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 134 (1997) (“The observer effect is an influence on 
the research which researchers produce through their expectations, predisposition and 
sometimes through their mere presence in the situation under study.”). 
 76. See, e.g., T Marshall et al., A Randomised Controlled Trial of the Effect of Anticipation 
of a Blood Test on Blood Pressure, 16 J. HUM. HYPERTENSION 621, 621 (2002) (“It was 
concluded that anticipation of a blood test affects measured systolic blood pressure in 
volunteers.”). 
 77. To be fair, this is not a problem unique to studies of placebo effects. It applies to some 
extent to studies of any medical treatment. 
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patients do not have conscious control over physiological placebo 
effects as they do over behavioral ones. 
C. Nocebo Effects 
At the beginning of Part I, I defined placebo effects quite 
generally as a change in health outcomes following treatment that is 
due to a patient’s expectation about the value of that treatment. One 
ought, however, to be more precise about what a placebo effect is. 
Whereas, in the common view, placebo effects typically improve 
health,78 the regulatory implications of these effects often focuses on 
cases in which expectations worsen health. Therefore, let me refine 
the definition of placebo effects to be the positive health effect of 
positive expectations about a therapy79 and introduce three other 
concepts. The first is a nocebo effect, which I define as a negative 
health effect of negative expectations about a therapy (or product).80 
The second is an inverse nocebo effect, which I define as a positive 
health effect from negative expectations about a therapy. The third is 
an inverse placebo effect, which I define as a negative health effect 
from positive expectations about a therapy. The relationship between 
these terms is illustrated in Table 1. Placebo-related effects flow from 
positive expectations and nocebo-related effects from negative 
expectations about a therapy (or product). To give these definitions 
greater salience, let me use an illustration. 
Recall the Malani study of the effect of changing the probability 
of treatment in statin trials on health outcomes among subjects in 
those trials.81 Its main finding was that patients in higher probability 
trials, because they believed they were more likely to be receiving 
active treatment rather than placebo, had on average lower LDL 
levels.82 This is a positive placebo effect because higher LDL levels 
increase the risk of stroke and heart failure.83 Interestingly, although 
this effect was found when trials for all statins were lumped together, 
 
 78. See Malani, supra note 2, at 236 (“A medical treatment is said to have placebo effects if 
patients who are optimistic about the treatment respond better to the treatment.”). 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 253 (describing the “‘nocebo’ or negative placebo effect”); see also Robert A. 
Hahn, The Nocebo Phenomenon: Scope and Foundations, in THE PLACEBO EFFECT 56, 56 
(Anne Harrington ed., 2000) (“The nocebo hypothesis proposes that expectations of sickness 
and the affective states associated with such expectations cause sickness in the expectant.”). 
 81. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Malani, supra note 2, at 249. 
 83. See id. at 244. 
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it was not found when trials of different types of statins were 
evaluated separately.84 For lovastatin (sold as Mevacor) and 
pravastatin (Pravachol), subjects in higher-probability trials actually 
had LDL levels that were 5.5 and 1.5 mg/dll higher, respectively, than 
subjects in lower-probability trials.85 This is an inverse placebo effect: 
higher expectations actually worsen outcomes. 
What might cause positive or inverse placebo effects? If placebo 
effects are a behavioral phenomenon, it is not hard to predict the 
mechanism behind such effects. Patients on statins may either take 
actions that complement their therapies—such as reduce their intake 
of fatty foods or exercise with greater frequency—or view statins 
prescriptions as licenses to eat more fatty foods or lapse on their 
exercise regimens. If treatment elicits complementary behavior, 
treatment would appear to trigger positive placebo effects. If 
treatment caused a substitution away from self-control behaviors, 
then treatment would appear to trigger inverse placebo effects. In this 
view, the inverse placebo effect is a synonym for moral hazard (in the 
economics literature), risk compensation (in psychology), or 
disinhibition (in public health).86 If placebo effects are a physiological 
phenomenon, one might speculate about a mechanism similar to the 
one in the behavioral model: the body responds to treatment by 
allocating more resources (hormones, blood flow, immune system 
resources, and so on) to the ailment—a complementary response and 
thus positive placebo effect—or by reallocating these resources to 
other problems—a substitution response and thus negative placebo 
effect. The difficulty in the physiological placebo effect case is that 
not enough is understood about the relationship between the central 
nervous system and the vascular, immune, and other “subconscious” 
systems to have any confidence in speculation. 
A second interesting finding in the Malani study is that patients 
in higher probability trials also reported the usual side effects 
associated with statins with greater frequency.87 As Figure 2 in this 
 
 84. See id. at 253 (“Although the top two statins by market size, Lipitor and Zocor, 
generate positive placebo effects roughly 30 percent the size of pharmacological effects of these 
drugs, other statins, Pravachol and Mevacor, generate negative expectation effects between 3 
percent and 9 percent the size of pharmacological effects.”). 
 85. See id. (“[W]ith Pravachol and Mevacor, patients expected a greater reduction in LDL 
in probability one trials relative to probability 0.5 trials, but they got a lower reduction in 
LDL.”). 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. at 249. 
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Article documents, side effects increased by 50 to 64 percent. This 
result is a nocebo effect because expectation of side effects from 
statins (which were elevated as the probability of receiving a statin 
rose) increased actual side effects from statins.88 The Malani study is 
not the only one to document a nocebo effect. Myers, Cairns, and 
Singer examined gastrointestinal side effects in a multicenter trial of 
aspirin or sulfinpyrazone in the treatment of unstable angina.89 After 
independent ethical review of the consent form at each of the study 
sites, this study’s consent forms specifically mentioned 
gastrointestinal side effects in two sites but not a third.90 Moreover, 
the form at the third site stated simply that active treatment is “well-
tolerated” by patients.91 As the reader might anticipate, the 
investigators found that subjects enrolled at the first two sites 
reported 28 percent higher rates of minor gastrointestinal side 
effects.92 There were no significant differences in major 
gastrointestinal side effects.93 But the minor side effects were 
important enough to raise dropout rates at the first two sites.94 The 
investigators concluded that specific mention of certain side effects 
raised expectations of, and thus incidence of, those side effects.95 
Unfortunately, no intuitive or serious theories explain the etiology of 
these effects. 
D. Triggers for Placebo Effects 
It should be apparent from the studies I have described that the 
sort of expectations that alter health outcomes can be triggered by a 
range of stimuli. The most common is the suggestion of efficacy or 
side effects by an expert such as the research investigator, who is in a 
form of doctor-patient relationship with subjects. The pain studies 
and Myers, Cairns, and Singer’s gastrointestinal-side-effect study 
provide examples. 
 
 88. See id. 
 89. Martin G. Myers, John A. Cairns & Joel Singer, The Consent Form as a Possible Cause 
of Side Effects, 42 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 250, 250 (1987). Angina is 
chest pain due to the lack of blood flow and thus oxygen to the heart muscle. See M. GABRIEL 
KHAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEART DISEASE 569 (2006). 
 90. Myers et al., supra note 89, at 250–51. 
 91. Id. at 251. 
 92. See id. at 252 tbl.2. 
 93. Id. at 250–52. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 250, 252. 
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A second stimulus is the expected value of treatment, which is 
the sum of every possible outcome weighted by the probability of that 
outcome.96 Evidence for the role of probabilities is provided by the 
Malani97 and the Malani and Houser studies,98 both of which 
employed those probabilities to manipulate expectations,99 and by 
Pollo et al.,100 which found that placebo effects under random 
assignment to active treatment or placebo were roughly half the 
placebo effects under (deceptive) assignment to active treatment.101 
Evidence for the role of every possible outcome may be found in 
Skovlund, which summarizes two studies of the pain killer 
paracetamol for postpartum pain—that is, pain following childbirth.102 
In those studies, Skovlund found that subjects in trials in which the 
control was an active medication (naproxen) reported lower levels of 
pain than subjects in trials in which their control was placebo. She 
concluded that the possibility of obtaining naproxen rather than 
placebo elevated even the outcomes of subjects who ultimately 
received paracetamol. 
A fascinating study by Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely in the 
marketing literature provides evidence of at least two other possible 
stimuli: the price of a product and advertising about the product.103 In 
a series of experiments, these investigators examined the effect of an 
energy drink on mental acuity, as measured by the number of puzzles 
that subjects could solve in thirty minutes.104 Subjects were 
randomized across two sets of treatments. In the first set, although all 
subjects were asked to pay for their energy drink, half were given a 
 
 96. See Mark S. Roberts & Frank A. Sonnenberg, Decision Modeling Techniques, in 
DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE 20, 27 (Gretchen B. Chapman & Frank A. Sonnenberg 
eds., 2000) (“The expected value of CHOICE 1 is simply the sum of the possible outcomes of 
that choice weighted by the probabilities of each outcome . . . .”). 
 97. Malani, supra note 2, at 236–56. 
 98. Malani & Houser, supra note 70 (manuscript at 9, 11). 
 99. See supra notes 36, 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 100. Pollo et al., supra note 8, at 77–84. 
 101. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 102. See Skovlund, supra note 7, at 1041 (citing E. Skovlund et al., Comparison of 
Postpartum Pain Treatments Using a Sequential Trial Design I. Paracetamol Versus Placebo, 40 
EUR. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 343, 343–47 (1991) [hereinafter Skovlund et al., Trial 
Design Part I]; E. Skovlund et al., Comparison of Postpartum Pain Treatments Using a 
Sequential Trial Design II. Naproxen Versus Paracetamol, 40 EUR. J. CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY 539, 539–42 (1991) [hereinafter Skovlund et al., Trial Design Part II]). 
 103. Baba Shiv, Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Placebo Effects of Marketing Actions: 
Consumers May Get What They Pay For, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 383, 391–92 (2005). 
 104. Id. at 386. 
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discount price (and told this). In the second set, half of the subjects 
were given positive advertising about the efficacy of the energy drink. 
The investigators found that subjects who paid a higher price for the 
energy drink solved 1.6–2.7 (or nearly 40 percent) more puzzles.105 
This can be verified by comparing the black versus white bars in 
Figure 4.106 They also found that subjects exposed to advertising 
solved 3.2–4.3 (or roughly 75 percent) more puzzles. Comparing the 
high expectancy condition (with advertising) to the low expectancy 
(no advertising) condition in Figure 4 verifies this result. 
Another interesting finding from the Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely 
study is that individuals who had previously consumed the energy 
drink used in their study experienced more significant positive 
placebo effects.107 This result is in line with the prior literature 
suggesting that placebo effects may be a conditioned response. 
Although some commentators suggest that conditioning—or 
experience—is just another way of generating expectations about a 
treatment,108 the more important point is that experience, like 
suggestion from authority, can generate the expectations that drive 
placebo effects. 
An important possible stimulus, but one that has not yet been 
documented, is dosage. I suspect that patients tend to believe that 
drugs are more effective at higher doses. If correct, then I predict that 
offering patients larger doses of an active treatment or pills that are 
padded with placebo filler to make them appear larger may generate 
positive placebo effects. The danger with simply increasing active 
dosage is that higher doses of an active therapy could also amplify 
side effects. For drug labeling and practice guidelines, it is necessary 
to know more about placebo effects of dosage. 
Beyond evidence about specific types of stimulus for placebo 
effects, it would be helpful—from a practical perspective—to know 
the answer to three other questions about the preconditions for or 
dynamics of placebo effects. The foremost is whether a treatment 
must have a positive pharmacological effect to generate a placebo 
effect. A good deal of prior research—such as the pain studies 
 
 105. Id. at 390. 
 106. This figure reproduces Figure 4 from the study. See id. at 390 fig.4. 
 107. Id. at 387. 
 108. See, e.g., Sibylle Klosterhalfen & Paul Enck, Psychobiology of the Placebo Response, 
125 AUTONOMIC NEUROSCIENCE: BASIC & CLINICAL 94, 96 fig.4 (2006) (highlighting that 
conditioning may alter expectations). 
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described earlier109—has suggested that the answer is no. Researchers 
have repeatedly been able to use suggestion to generate pain relief or 
modification in blood pressure following consumption of inert pills.110 
Suggestion in the clinical trial setting is a far cry from suggestion by a 
doctor.111 And if the placebo effects from treatments without 
pharmacological action are limited or zero, then the cost of ignoring 
placebo effect in, for example, drug regulation is also limited. 
Second, does telling subjects about placebo effects alter those 
effects? The most informative study on this topic is Shiv, Carmon, 
and Ariely’s study. When the investigators drew subjects’ attention to 
the placebo effect by directly asking subjects whether price—or more 
precisely the discount—conveyed information about quality of the 
energy drink, the placebo effect disappeared.112 This result does not 
demonstrate that placebo effects only occur when patients do not 
think about them, but it does tend to support that conclusion. 
Presumably telling subjects about placebo effects direct their 
attention to why they think a treatment will be effective; in Shiv, 
Carmon, and Ariely’s study this direction diminishes the placebo 
effect.113 More research is needed in this area because of its relevance 
to the debate over informed consent for the provision of placebo 
therapies. 
A third question that has policy relevance is whether the sort of 
beliefs about drug efficacy that generate placebo effects change 
significantly over time. One reason to suspect this change is that 
patients, perhaps through their doctors or their own investigations, 
are continuously being exposed to new research and anecdotes about 
medications they take or the alternatives to medications they take, 
which may modify their expectations about these medications. These 
 
 109. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 110. See, e.g., S.B. Penick & Lawrence E. Hinkle, The Effect of Expectation on Response to 
Phenmetrazine, 26 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 369, 369–74 (1964). 
 111. Further evidence comes from the casual observation that many complementary and 
alternative medications (CAMs), such as echinacea, have very large markets despite limited 
evidence that these medications have pharmacological effects. See Franklin et al., supra note 14, 
at 600 (“It is estimated that between 29% and 42% of adults in the United States use 1 or more 
CAM treatments during a year.”). Perhaps consumers nevertheless persist in buying these 
medications for their placebo effects. The problem with this logic is that studies of CAMs fail to 
rule out the possibility that although the average consumer experiences no positive 
pharmacological response to a medication, a subpopulation does, and it is this subpopulation 
that repeatedly purchases that medication. 
 112. See Shiv et al., supra note 103, at 388–89. 
 113. Id. at 389. 
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changes may be reflected in patients’ responses to treatment. Of 
particular concern is that patients appear to be quite optimistic about 
new drugs; then, as clinical trials reveal that the drug is not a panacea, 
expectations decline. This possibility creates the risk that drugs that 
have strong placebo effects early on will have lower placebo effects 
down the road. Another concern is that well-publicized anecdotes or 
even litigation about the side effects of a drug may increase the 
incidence of nocebo effects from the drug. There is simply no 
research that sheds light on this issue. 
II.  REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF PLACEBO EFFECTS 
The methodological limitations of many placebo effect studies 
discussed at the start of Part I and the outstanding but important 
research questions identified throughout that Part suggest it might be 
premature to conclude that placebo effects require particular legal 
reforms. Nevertheless, I believe it is appropriate to begin discussing 
how placebo effects might impact legal regulation in a host of fields, 
ranging from drug law to tort law. 
As a threshold matter, the sheer quantity of studies finding 
evidence consistent with such placebo effects makes it hard to deny 
they exist. The existence of placebo effects is merely a necessary 
reason to justify speculation about the legal relevance of this 
phenomenon. One sufficient reason is that an understanding of the 
policy and legal implications of placebo effects will help guide future 
research on placebo effects to ensure the research has maximum 
practical impact. Highlighting potential policy impacts will guide 
researchers to questions, such as whether beliefs that generate 
placebo effects or the effects themselves can be controlled by 
subjects, and to methodological improvements, especially to external 
validity, that will make the research more useful for the future 
discussion of policy impacts. Another sufficient reason to begin 
discussing placebo effects is that these effects have both complex and 
perhaps profound implications for traditional models of regulation. 
Those models emphasize physical causes of injury in a way best 
characterized by the adage: sticks and stones may break my bones but 
words never hurt me. Placebo effects suggest that words (more 
precisely, their effect on expectations) can hurt me. But there may be 
important side effects to regulating words, and the optimal degree of 
regulation is not obvious. It will take time to resolve these issues and 
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the sooner they enter the public debate, the sooner they can be 
resolved. 
A. Drug Law 
The area of law most obviously impacted by placebo effects is 
drug law. And the most important drug law reform suggested by the 
evidence of placebo effects is that the FDA should consider these 
effects in making drug approval decisions.114 
1. Correcting Bias from Placebo Effects. But before turning to 
that bold proposition, I offer a more modest suggestion. Even if the 
FDA continues only to consider pharmacological effects in deciding 
whether to allow a drug to be marketed, it should consider placebo 
effects and nocebo effects in the course of determining 
pharmacological efficacy and safety, respectively.115 The reason is that 
placebo and nocebo effects may interact with pharmacological effects 
such that the gold standard of evidence for efficacy—the randomized 
controlled trial—incorrectly estimates pharmacological effects. 
The Malani 2006 study provides an illustration. Recall that the 
study treated differences in the probability of treatment in different 
trials as manipulations of subjects’ expectations.116 Interestingly, 
regression analysis of results from ulcer trials revealed that rates of 
healing rose with the probability of treatment in arms given active 
treatment (H2-blockers and PPIs) but not in arms given placebo 
control.117 Figure 5 plots the results assuming linear placebo effects. 
 
 114. The FDA drug approval process for most drugs has two basic steps. After a drug 
company has completed in vitro and animal tests on a chemical entity, the company files an 
Investigational New Drug (IND) application to obtain the right to test the drug on humans. 21 
U.S.C. § 355(i) (2006). These clinical tests have three phases. Phase I tests study a few normal 
subjects to determine the toxicity of different dosages of the drug. Phase II tests involve only 
sick subjects and large sample sizes to determine if the drug demonstrates some efficacy. Phase 
III tests involve even larger samples of sick subjects and are typically randomized controlled 
trials. Their goal is to provide compelling statistical evidence on both safety and efficacy. After 
these studies are completed, the company submits a New Drug Application (NDA). Id. § 
355(b)(1). The FDA must determine if the drug is safe and whether there is “substantial 
evidence” of efficacy before it can approve the drug for marketing. Id. § 355(d). In many cases 
the FDA can approve the drug subject to further so-called Phase IV studies of the drug’s safety 
profile after marketing has begun. 
 115. For a discussion of how the FDA might do this with only a slight tweak of the existing 
approval process, see infra Part II.A.4. 
 116. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 117. The regression analysis includes not just trials with probabilities 0.5 and 1 but also trials 
with other probabilities of treatment. See Malani, supra note 2, at 251 & n.14. 
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The y-axis gives the benefits in terms of the fraction of subjects who 
were healed. (For simplicity, I have normalized the pharmacological 
effect of placebo to zero.) The x-axis gives the probability of 
treatment. The lower solid line projects outcomes in the placebo 
control arm of a trial as the probability of treatment rises. The upper 
solid line projects outcomes in the H2-blocker arms. According to the 
regression analysis, the lower line is flat and the upper line is rising. 
If a new drug application for an average H2-blocker were only to 
include results from placebo controlled trials in which half of subjects 
were treated, then it would overestimate the pharmacological efficacy 
of the drug. To see this, initially note that the outcome in the H2-
blocker arm of a half-treated trial is roughly 31 percent. This includes 
the pharmacological effect, which is the difference between the upper 
and lower lines at probability zero, that is, where expectation is 
playing no role. It also includes half the roughly 26 percent placebo 
effects estimated in H2-blocker arms.
118 The reason is that subjects 
only think there is a half probability of treatment and thus experience 
only half the full expectation effect of treatment. Next, consider that 
pharmacological effects are ordinarily estimated by taking the 
difference between outcomes in the treatment arm and the placebo-
control arm. If the placebo effect altered outcomes in the placebo-
control arm the same as in H2-blocker arms, then the placebo effect 
from the H2-blocker arm and the placebo effect from the placebo-
control arm would cancel. This is illustrated by the dotted line in 
Figure 5. The problem is that the placebo effect does not actually 
alter the efficacy of the placebo control. Therefore, as the probability 
of treatment increases, one’s estimate of pharmacological effects 
rises. In half-treated trials, this relationship means that instead of an 
outcome of 13 percent in placebo control arms, one observes an 
outcome of 0 percent. This leads one to estimate pharmacological 
effects of 31 percent (31 percent minus 0 percent) rather than the 
correct amount of 18 percent (31 percent minus 13 percent). 
Two caveats are in order. First, the bias from the failure to 
account for placebo effects when estimating pharmacological efficacy 
is not always positive. In contexts other than H2-blocker versus 
placebo trials, it might be that placebo effects raise outcomes in the 
control arm more than they raise outcomes in the treatment arm. 
 
 118. The 31 percent and 26 percent numbers are estimated by averaging over the four H2-
blockers listed in Table 6 of my study, which employs 50 percent placebo-controlled trials to 
estimate pharmacological effects. Id. at 252 tbl.6. 
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Indeed, this would be the case, for example, if one were conducting a 
noninferiority trial119 in which the treatment was PPI and the control 
was an H2-blocker. The former has a placebo effect of roughly 1.5 
percent, whereas the latter has a placebo effect of 26 percent. Thus 
the relative pharmacological effect of PPIs is underestimated by 
roughly 12.25 percent (0.75 percent minus 13 percent).120 Second, 
when there are nocebo effects and those effects are not symmetric 
across treatment and control arms, the bias from expectation effects 
also biases estimates of side effects from drugs. Unless the 
expectation bias in estimates of side effects is exactly the same as 
expectation bias in estimates of pharmacological efficacy, the FDA 
cannot simply ignore these effects on the assumption that they cancel 
when the agency balances efficacy with safety in judging a new drug 
application. 
Expectation bias is not a concern when a drug clearly has large 
pharmacological effects and small placebo and nocebo effects. In this 
case, accounting for the expectation bias would not alter the FDA’s 
judgment. If, however, the expectation effects are large, then the 
FDA may be rejecting drugs it should approve and approving drugs it 
should reject. (As an example, consider the hypothetical in which the 
pharmacological effect of H2-blockers was zero but the placebo effect 
remained 13 percent. The FDA would incorrectly approve H2-
blockers for ulcers.) That is a serious concern even under the existing 
standard for drug review. 
2. Crediting Nocebo and Placebo Effects when Judging Safety and 
Efficacy.  Matters only become more complicated when one considers 
the more radical claim that the FDA ought to consider both placebo 
and nocebo effects—not just pharmacological effects—when 
determining whether to approve the marketing of a new drug or 
withdraw marketing approval for an existing drug. The proposition 
relies on two assumptions: expectation effects are real and they 
operate outside of the clinical trial context. Part I reviewed a number 
 
 119. A noninferiority trial is one in which a new treatment is compared to an existing 
treatment. KENNETH ROCKWOOD & SERGE GAUTHIER, TRIAL DESIGNS AND OUTCOMES IN 
DEMENTIA THERAPEUTIC RESEARCH 279 (2005). The goal is to show the new treatment is “not 
inferior” to the conventional treatment, that is, does not have a statistically significant negative 
treatment effect relative to the conventional treatment. Id. 
 120. The 1.5 percent number is estimated by averaging over the two PPIs listed in Table 6. 
Malani, supra note 2, at 252 tbl.6. 
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of studies that support the first assumption. But what evidence 
supports the second? 
One piece of evidence is that some of the studies—namely the 
Malani (2006) and Malani and Houser studies—are externally valid, 
that is, they can be extrapolated to cases outside the trial context. 
Consider what happens, for instance, when patients consume a drug 
outside the trial context. They actually consume two separate things. 
One is the pharmacological effect of the drug. The other is an 
expectation that, with certainty, they are consuming the drug. Now 
consider my technique of manipulating the probability of treatment in 
a trial to estimate placebo effects.121 This technique estimates the full 
placebo effect by projecting the change in outcomes when going from 
a trial in which 0 percent of subjects are treated to one in which 100 
percent are treated. The motivation is that being in a 100 percent trial 
in which you are certain you are consuming the drug is like 
consuming the drug with certainty outside the trial context. If the 
analogy is correct, my findings are externally valid: they suggest that 
ulcer medications, statins, and caffeine have placebo effects in the 
real world. 
Another piece of evidence that placebo effects operate in 
nonexperimental settings is somewhat indirect. Given research 
suggesting that alternative medications such as echinacea have no 
pharmacological effects122 (and ignoring that the results might be 
biased because of placebo effects in the trial setting), it would be hard 
to explain the magnitude of the market for these alternative 
medications (estimated at $36–47 billion in 1997, with echinacea the 
most frequently used alternative medication123) without recourse to 
real-world placebo effects. 
Even under a liberal interpretation of these data points, it is 
reasonable to remain skeptical of the claim that placebo effects 
 
 121. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 122. See, e.g., James A. Taylor et al., Efficacy and Safety of Echinacea in Treating Upper 
Respiratory Tract Infections in Children: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 290 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 2824, 2829 (2003) (finding echinacea ineffective in treating upper respiratory tract 
infection symptoms in young children); Ronald B. Turner et al., An Evaluation of Echinacea 
angustifolia in Experimental Rhinovirus Infections, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 341, 347 (2005) 
(concluding that extracts of Echinacea augustifolia do not have clinically significant effects on 
rhinovirus infection or disease). 
 123. See PATRICIA M. BARNES ET AL., COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE 
USE AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2002, at 1, 9 (Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Advance 
Data Report No. 343, 2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad343.pdf. 
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operate outside the trial context. This skepticism suggests a priority 
for future research. In the interim, however, I shall assume for the 
purpose of discussion that expectations alter outcomes in 
nonacademic settings. How exactly, then, should the FDA modify the 
manner in which it approves drugs? 
The answer depends on whether informing people that a drug 
operates through expectation effects (“placebo instructions” for 
short) disables those effects. Suppose it does not. Then the FDA can 
simply treat placebo and nocebo effects the same way it treats 
pharmacological effects. When deciding whether a drug is effective, 
the FDA should consider the sum of positive pharmacological effects 
and placebo effects. When determining the side effects from a drug, it 
should consider the sum of pharmacological side effects and nocebo 
effects.124 These expectations would naturally take their proper role in 
the agency’s balancing of efficacy and safety risk when judging 
drugs.125 
What is the appropriate reform if, however, placebo instructions 
do defuse expectation effects? In this case, the FDA’s decision to 
approve a drug would depend on its regulations concerning drug 
labeling following approval126 because the latter affects the 
expectation effects from a drug.127 Moreover, the proper reform would 
depend on whether the expectation effect at issue is positive or 
negative. Because positive placebo effects are good, one would not 
 
 124. This approach likely would not require a legislative change. The Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act requires proof of “safety” and “efficacy.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(2) (2006). It does 
not define those terms. (Nor does the legislative history. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 87-1744, at 16 
(1962).) The FDA could use its Chevron discretion to interpret those terms to include 
expectation-driven effects. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984). 
 125. See David F. Cavers, The Legal Control of the Clinical Investigation of Drugs: Some 
Political, Economic, and Social Questions, 98 DAEDALUS 427, 429–30 (1969) (describing the 
FDA’s balancing of efficacy and safety risk during drug evaluations). 
 126. See Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 
11 (1973) (“The FDA not only decides whether a drug may be marketed, it also determines how 
it may be promoted and sold. The agency approves, and for practical purposes prescribes, the 
labeling that the drug must bear.”). 
 127. One might quibble that no one reads labels. But that actually simplifies matters 
because then the FDA can simply assume that labeling will not diffuse placebo effects. The real 
problem is that the truth is probably somewhere in between; that is, some consumers read 
labels, but others do not. In this case, the government would want to consider omitting positive 
expectation effects and advertising—not merely labeling but actually broadcasting—negative 
expectation effects. 
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want labeling to defuse them. Because nocebo and negative placebo 
effects are bad, however, it would be useful if labeling defused them. 
The common sense reform this difference suggests is that the 
FDA should consider positive placebo effects in drug approval 
decisions but not distinguish positive placebo and pharmacological 
effects in labeling. Conversely, the FDA should not consider nocebo 
effects and negative placebo effects in drug approval, but should 
highlight that drugs have these effects in labeling. These 
recommendations do not qualitatively change if placebo instructions 
only partly diffuse expectation effects. The damage from labels that 
highlight positive expectation effects and the benefits from those that 
highlight negative expectation effects are proportional to the extent 
of diffusion. 
This asymmetric approach presents two difficulties. First, 
perhaps consumers are hyperrational and hypersensitive about 
placebo effects. Even if the FDA does not tell them which drugs have 
positive placebo effects, they know the FDA credits those effects 
when approving drugs. This knowledge may be sufficient to disable 
positive placebo effects for drugs that have them.128 One response is to 
offer a “Track B” for drug approval. Track B would operate much as 
the Food and Drug Act did before its 1962 reform: the FDA would 
review drugs for safety but not efficacy.129 (The existing Track A 
would require both proof of safety and efficacy.) A Track B approach 
is unlikely to renew placebo effects, however, if consumers are 
hypersensitive, not only to specific placebo instructions, but also the 
general possibility that a drug may have placebo effects. These 
consumers would infer that a drug company that sought approval 
under Track B did so because its drug had placebo effects. They 
therefore would not experience the positive placebo effects from that 
Track B–approved drug. 
Although the prospect that the FDA can never consider placebo 
effects without disabling them is dismaying, the prospect is not very 
 
 128. It does not necessarily reduce the efficacy of drugs that do not have placebo effects 
unless that knowledge of a chance of placebo effects counteracts even pharmacological effects. 
There is no research that supports (or contradicts) this possibility. But it does seem contrary to 
the common sense of placebo instructions. 
 129. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)–(c), 76 Stat. 780, 781 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p)(1)–(2), 355(b)(1)(A) (2006)). See generally Note, 
Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185 (1971) (tracing the 
development and assessing the performance of the drug efficacy requirements in the Drug 
Amendments of 1962). 
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likely. A form of Track B approval already exists. If a company does 
not make specific claims about the therapeutic value of its treatment 
(and its product is not otherwise a controlled substance), then it does 
not have to seek FDA approval.130 Not applying for approval is the 
track that, for example, the product “Airborne” pursued,131 as did 
numerous alternative medications such as echinacea. Yet those 
products have a sizable consumer base.132 There is reason (given 
earlier)133 to suspect the treatments operate partly through placebo 
effects. If these placebo effects were not disabled when their 
manufacturers refused to seek FDA approval, they are unlikely to be 
disabled by the fact that, in general, the FDA considers placebo 
effects in approval decisions.134 Little evidence exists showing the 
effect of placebo instruction generally, and no evidence suggests that 
the possibility of placebo effects disables these effects. Finally, it 
might be quite reasonable to assume that consumers have too much 
else on their minds to notice that the FDA considers placebo effects 
in making approval decisions. In other words, bounded rationality 
might actually assist the placebo effect. 
The second problem with the FDA considering positive placebo 
effects in its approval decisions is that it seems odd—or at least 
politically suspect—to have a decision rule that appears biased 
toward favorable conclusions about new drug applications. By 
considering positive effects but ignoring negative effects, the FDA 
appears to have a thumb (or an even heavier thumb) on the scale in 
favor of drug companies. But this view fails to understand the 
fundamental shift in the role of the FDA in the context of placebo 
effects. The FDA regulates marketing, and placebo effects imply that 
marketing affects treatment outcomes. Therefore the FDA is no 
longer merely an impartial judge of drugs, but rather partly a health 
care provider just like the doctor who prescribes a drug. In this role, 
 
 130. See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD 
AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 477 (3d ed. 2007). 
 131. Although Airborne avoided having to file a new drug application with the FDA, it was 
subject to a false advertising suit that it settled. See Airborne® Settlement, http://www. 
airbornehealthsettlement.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). 
 132. Kerry Fehr-Snyder, Herbal Cold Remedy Goes Airborne After Oprah Plug, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Feb. 1, 2005, at E1. 
 133. See text accompanying supra note 124. 
 134. One distinction between treatments for which FDA approval is not sought and those 
for which Track B might be sought is that the costs of the former are so high that consumers 
think it is rational that companies do not seek approval for drugs with positive pharmacological 
effects. There would also be a cost difference between Track B and Track A. 
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the FDA ought to take actions to ensure that the drug is as beneficial 
to the patient as possible. Doing so does not require exaggerating the 
drug’s efficacy, but may justify nondisclosure of how the drug works. 
It may also justify not merely approving drugs despite nocebo effects 
but also attempting to eliminate those effects by informing people 
those effects are just in their heads.135 
3. The Case of Pure Placebo Therapies.  Whether or not patients 
are sensitive to placebo instructions, and thus whether or not the 
FDA ought to take an asymmetric approach to weighing expectation 
effects in drug approval, a natural source of concern will be whether 
the FDA ought to approve drugs with no pharmacological effects but 
with a positive placebo effect. In other words, should the FDA 
approve pure placebo therapies? Before answering this question, one 
may query whether inert substances can even have placebo effects. 
The evidence on this is limited and mixed. My meta-analysis of ulcer 
trials finds that outcomes in the placebo control arms of these trials 
did not rise with the probability of treatment.136 This finding suggests 
pure placebos do not have placebo effects. The study, however, is not 
conclusive. First, even though it found evidence of placebo effects in 
the treatment arms of ulcer trials,137 my design tended to 
underestimate placebo effects in all the arms. For instance, subjects in 
low-probability trials may have sought treatment outside the context 
of the experiment. Their extra treatment would have exaggerated 
outcomes in low-probability trials and thus reduce the difference 
 
 135. Eliminating nocebo effects by educating consumers may be easier said than done. 
Different people may have different levels of sensitivity to placebo instructions. If the FDA 
discounts nocebo effects but warns that side effects are really nocebo effects in drug labeling, 
the warning may benefit consumers who are sensitive to such instructions but harm those who 
are not. Those who are insensitive to instructions will experience nocebo effects. This issue of 
differing consumer responses is not like ordinary problems of heterogeneity in treatment 
effects. If a drug has different effects on different people, the FDA can approve the drug and let 
doctors determine for whom the drug is appropriate. With labeling, however, all patients get the 
same treatment. Alternatively, the FDA could require doctors to warn patients who are 
insensitive to instruction that they will experience the nocebo effects or not to prescribe those 
drugs with such effects. Whether this strategy is feasible depends on whether doctors can 
distinguish sensitive and insensitive patients. Given the FDA’s current approach to ordinary 
treatment heterogeneity, it appears the agency does not have much faith in doctors. See Anup 
Malani & Feifang Hu, The Option Value of New Therapeutics 14 (May 30, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 136. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
 137. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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between outcomes in high- and low-probability arms.138 Therefore, it 
is possible that the design simply missed the placebo effects in the 
placebo control arm. Second, even though pure placebos might not be 
able to heal ulcers, they may be able to ameliorate other ailments. For 
example, all the pain studies in Part I generated analgesic effects from 
pure placebos. True, studies such as Pollo et al.’s employ somewhat 
subjective measures of pain relief,139 but others employ naloxone or 
brain scans to demonstrate at least physiological correlates, if not 
proof, of pain reduction.140 At most one can say, then, that it is 
uncertain whether a drug must have a pharmacological effect to 
generate placebo effects. 
For the sake of thoroughness, I should explore the consequences 
if pure placebos can have placebo effects. The economist Russell 
Sobel argues that the FDA ought to approve pure placebos for the 
simple reason that they have positive therapeutic value.141 In his favor, 
one might argue that there is no theoretical difference between a drug 
with both pharmacological and placebo effects and a drug with just 
placebo effects, especially if placebo effects operate through 
physiological channels. Why should the FDA privilege one causal 
pathway over another, especially when it often cannot even identify 
the causal pathway of pharmacologically active drugs and is willing to 
separately approve mixtures or combinations of pharmacologically 
active therapies?142 But before embracing Sobel’s proposal, it is 
reasonable to ask whether a change is necessary. The existing system 
may not allow pure placebo manufacturers to make precise medical 
claims, but it may allow them to make nonspecific claims about health 
promotion without getting FDA approval.143 The FDA also has 
 
 138. Thus my design suffered the same methodological flaw as Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche. 
See supra note 9. Both studies were subject to false negatives. Therefore, Hróbjartsson and 
Gøtzsche’s negative finding, like my negative finding in the placebo arm of ulcer trials, does not 
disprove the existence of placebo effects. And my positive finding in treatment arms provides 
strong support, indeed a lower bound, for placebo effects. 
 139. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 52–69. 
 141. See Sobel, supra note 1, at 465. 
 142. For example, in 1997 the FDA approved Combivir, a mixture of the reverse 
transcriptase inhibitors zidovudine (AZT) and lamivudine (3TC), even though each component 
had been separately approved years earlier. John Henkel, Attacking AIDS with a ‘Cocktail’ 
Therapy: Drug Combo Sends Deaths Plummeting, FDA CONSUMER, July/Aug. 1999, at 12, 14, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1999/499_aids.html. 
 143. See, e.g., United States. v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., No. C-91-1332 DLJ, 1993 WL 13585505, 
at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 1993) (holding that promotional claims alone do not determine 
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discretion not to regulate a placebo because it poses no medical 
risk.144 And the market for nonapproved drugs, mainly the market for 
alternative medicines, is quite large—on the order of tens of billions 
of dollars.145 Unless consumers are being misled even on repeat 
purchases of therapies like echinacea, this is a lower bound on the 
value of placebo effects generated from pure placebos under current 
law. Nevertheless, Sobel argues that the 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments to the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, which the FDA 
has interpreted to require that manufacturers demonstrate their drugs 
are pharmacologically effective, led to removals of several hundred 
pure placebos from the marketplace.146 The problem is that Sobel 
does not quantify the value of these banned drugs.147 
4. Open Research Questions and Recommendations for Reform.  
Where does that leave us? There are two important research 
questions that must be answered before one can convincingly argue 
for equal treatment of pure placebos and pharmacologically active 
drugs with placebo effects. The first follows from the discussion from 
the discussion in Section A.3: can vague statements about the health 
benefits of a pure placebo generate the same placebo effects as 
specific instructions about a pure placebo’s medical consequences? If 
so, then the FDA’s benign neglect policy toward alternative 
medicines may be a reasonable compromise. The second question 
addresses the implicit assumption behind the discomfort with FDA 
approval of pure placebos: are there hidden, incremental costs to 
encouraging placebo effects with pure placebo therapies? For 
 
whether a product constitutes a drug that the FDA can regulate pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 
321(g)(1)(B)). Airborne, for example, claims it helps prevent colds, but is not regulated as a 
drug by the FDA. It is helpful that it contains a disclaimer that its claims were not evaluated by 
the FDA. See Airborne Health: Terms and Conditions, http://www.airbornehealth.com/tc.php 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2008); see also Nutri-Cology, 1993 WL 13585505, at *10, *8–10 (holding that 
standard disclaimers “can be considered along with other evidence of the product’s intended 
use”). 
 144. See, e.g., Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334–35 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 123. 
 146. See Sobel, supra note 1, at 471–72. The drugs to which he refers are pharmacologically 
ineffective for their marketed purpose but not necessarily inert “sugar” pills. 
 147. It is not obviously an argument against approval of pure placebos that whatever these 
pure placebos can achieve, pharmacologically active drugs can achieve as well or better. No 
evidence shows that patients always get a larger overall effect—pharmacological plus placebo 
effects—with a pharmacologically active alternative to a pure placebo with only a placebo 
effect. Even if that were the case, no active drug substitutes for a given pure placebo may exist, 
or the active drug substitute may have a more serious risk of side effects. 
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example, will they divert consumers from active drugs, or generally 
shake faith in nonplacebo medicines?148 Do they yield otherwise 
suboptimal health-related behaviors or misallocation of the body’s 
physiological resources? With little empirical research on these topics 
available, any answer to these questions is pure conjecture. 
Even if one were to solve the problem of whether to approve 
pure placebos, the challenge of actually estimating placebo and 
nocebo effects would remain. How could the FDA estimate these 
effects? One approach is to piggyback on existing regulations that 
require drug companies, in ordinary cases, to conduct two Phase III 
clinical trials.149 The FDA by regulation could require that the two 
trials have different probabilities of treatment and extrapolate the 
expectation effects from the change in outcomes due to the change in 
treatment probability. A second approach would be to permit or 
require drug companies to submit observational studies or unblinded 
experimental studies (on top of blinded experimental studies) to 
support their new drug applications. The difference between 
observational and unblinded experimental studies is that the former 
do not randomly assign subjects to treatment. Both, however, are 
unblinded. The advantage of not blinding subjects is that they 
experience the full expectation effect of active treatment when they 
are given active treatment. Therefore the difference between 
outcomes in the treatment group and outcomes in the placebo control 
group captures the pharmacological effects of treatment as well as the 
full expectation effect of treatment. The disadvantage of either 
varying the probability of treatment or unblinding is that the subjects 
in the treatment group may not be the same as subjects in the control 
group. I already described this flaw in my design.150 In observational 
studies the problem is that different subjects choose the treatment 
and control. In the unblinded experiments the subjects may differ 
because certain members of the placebo control group drop out or 
simultaneously seek conventional treatment outside the study. If the 
differences between subjects across groups are not observed and 
statistically controlled, they can introduce selection bias into 
estimates of total effects. Because those that are or remain in the 
placebo group have a higher rate of natural healing or seek alternate 
 
 148. John Thomas hypothesizes this may be so. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 343. 
 149. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 130, at 690–91 n.2. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
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therapy outside the study, the selection bias will probably cause the 
FDA to underestimate placebo effects.151 
Before concluding this Section, let me draw attention to a topic 
that is often an afterthought in drug regulation: postapproval 
monitoring. The FDA has the authority to require continued (“Phase 
IV”) studies of drug efficacy and safety even after a drug is approved 
for marketing.152 The rationale is that these studies may inform the 
agency about whether to revoke marketing approval.153 Postapproval 
studies are even more important in the context of placebo effects 
because these effects are triggered by expectations, which, unlike 
pharmacological effects, may fluctuate over time. As the discussion in 
Part I.D suggested, new research, news stories of side effects, and 
even litigation might (in theory) modify the expectation effects of 
drugs. If these effects are dramatic, the FDA may want to consider 
withdrawing the drug. This claim is subject to the caveat that if 
placebo instructions disable expectation effects, the proper response 
to growing nocebo effects may be not be withdrawal; it may be 
labeling that highlights, for example, that a surge in side effects is just 
nocebo effects. 
B. Health Law 
This Section examines the implications of placebo effects for 
three areas of health law: informed consent, fraud by doctors, and 
medical malpractice. (Part II.C considers fraud by nondoctors.) But 
before turning to these topics, the reader should note that there is one 
area of health law that already considers, to a limited extent, the role 
of placebo effects. Although it is rare, patients occasionally sue 
doctors in contract on the theory that the doctor promised a certain 
outcome from treatment but failed to deliver that outcome. Courts 
impose higher standards of proof in these warranties-of-a-cure cases 
than in cases in which patients simply allege that doctors promised a 
treatment and did not provide that treatment. Warranties of a cure 
 
 151. See Anup Malani, Patient Enrollment in Medical Trials: Selection Bias in a Randomized 
Experiment, 144 J. ECONOMETRICS 341, 341–42 (2008). 
 152. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (2006). 
 153. See Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use of Postmarketing 
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 300–33 
(2006). 
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must be explicit and precise.154 For example, they do not find 
warranties when the doctor merely provides assurance that the 
therapy will work155 or offers an (incorrect) prediction about the 
outcome from treatment.156 Courts typically justify this stricter 
standard by arguing that doctors’ positive opinions may trigger 
placebo effects in patients. They worry that a loose standard for 
treatment warranties could hamper desirable effects.157 Courts view 
this as a normal and perhaps even desirable state of affairs. 
1. Informed Consent.  The law of informed consent requires that 
doctors disclose the material risks of their treatment strategy,158 as 
well as alternatives to that strategy.159 Depending on the jurisdiction, 
either the custom of doctors or the expectations and needs of patients 
determine which risks are material.160 These requirements raise three 
questions about the ability of doctors to manage expectation effects: 
(1) If a doctor employs a pure placebo as therapy, must the doctor tell 
the patient it is a placebo? (2) If a doctor chooses one therapy over 
another because of placebo effects, and neither is a pure placebo, 
must the doctor inform the patient that her choice was driven by 
placebo effects? (3) Can a doctor avoid nocebo side effects by not 
informing a patient of these side effects? The first question concerns 
the duty to reveal the treatment, the second concerns the duty to 
justify the treatment, and the third concerns the duty to describe the 
risks of treatment. I now consider each case in turn. 
 
 154. Courts have required clear and convincing proof that the doctor promised a particular 
outcome. See, e.g., Burns v. Wannamaker, 315 S.E.2d 179, 181 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), aff’d and 
modified 343 S.E.2d 27 (S.C. 1986) (per curiam). In some states, the Statute of Frauds requires 
warranties of a cure to be in writing and signed. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-18-12-1 (2008) 
(“Liability may not be imposed on a health care provider on the basis of an alleged breach of 
contract . . . assuring results to be obtained from any procedure undertaken in the course of 
health care, unless the contract is in writing and signed [by the provider] . . . .”); 40 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1303.105 (West 2008) (“In the absence of a special contract in writing, a health 
care provider is neither a warrantor nor a guarantor of a cure.”). 
 155. See Ferlito v. Cecola, 419 So. 2d 102, 105 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a dentist’s 
promise that crown work would make the patient’s teeth “pretty” did not constitute a 
guarantee). 
 156. See Anglin v. Kleeman, 665 A.2d 747, 750 (N.H. 1995) (holding that a doctor’s 
statement to a patient that, after knee surgery, his knee would be “stronger than . . . before” was 
not a warranty (alteration in original) (quoting the lower court record)). 
 157. E.g., Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973). 
 158. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 315–16 (2d ed. 2000). 
 159. Id. at 324. 
 160. E.g., MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH 
CARE LAW AND ETHICS 201 (6th ed. 2003). 
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How informed consent should account for whether a doctor may 
employ a pure placebo as therapy without disclosing this to a patient 
depends on whether informing a patient of positive placebo effects 
disables those effects. If placebo instructions have no deleterious 
effect, then no change in informed consent law is required. Doctors 
must tell patients that they are using a placebo therapy; there should 
be no loss in efficacy.161 But the conventional wisdom among doctors 
is that informing patients of placebo effects disables those effects.162 If 
they are correct, then there appears to be serious tension between the 
goals of obtaining consent and taking advantage of placebo effects. 
One theory that might resolve the tension is that a patient’s 
initial consent to treatment by a physician constitutes consent to all 
specific treatments that physician employs. In other words, the 
patient consents to the doctor rather than consent to the treatments.163 
Perhaps in part because few courts have squarely confronted the 
question of consent to placebo therapy, no case law supports this 
view. It is true that it is a battery for one doctor to tell a patient that 
that doctor will perform a treatment but have another doctor actually 
perform the treatment.164 But it is incorrect to draw from these cases 
the negative implication that it is acceptable to not disclose treatment. 
Other cases hold that it is a battery for a doctor to promise one 
treatment but deliver another.165 Together the two sets of cases imply 
that consent is given to specific treatments by specific physicians, not 
just to specific physicians. It is also surely the case that a patient could 
explicitly consent to all treatments by a physician. But such consents 
are rare. Even then, courts are likely to ask the physicians to inform 
patients of the risks of such blanket consents, including the possibility 
 
 161. Nor is there a problem with patients’ ability to consent to a pure placebo. See, e.g., 
Suenram v. Soc’y Valley Hosp., 383 A.2d 143, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977) (holding that a patient 
has fundamental right to consent to a treatment, laetrile, on the advice of a doctor, whether or 
not the treatment is approved by the state and even if the treatment is merely a “mildly toxic 
placebo”). 
 162. See, e.g., Jurcich v. Gen. Motors Corp., 539 S.W.2d 595, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) 
(reporting that the defendant’s expert doctors opined that informing the plaintiff that he was 
given a placebo would defeat the placebo effect). 
 163. See Boozang, supra note 1, at 737–39 (suggesting that, under any of a number of 
different theoretical models, patients could implicitly or explicitly consent to any treatment—
including placebo therapies—offered by their physicians). 
 164. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Recovery by Patient on Whom Surgery or Other 
Treatment Was Performed by One Other than Physician Who Patient Believed Would Perform It, 
39 A.L.R.4th 1034, 1035 (1985) (citing Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1983)). 
 165. See HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 202. 
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that the patient will receive placebo therapies.166 Depending on what 
future research on placebo instructions reveals, it may be that even 
the possibility of placebo therapies defeats placebo effects. 
Turn now to the second case, in which a doctor wants to employ 
drug A rather than B because of placebo effects from drug A. Must 
doctors inform their patients that their choice of drug A was 
motivated by placebo effects? This case is different than the first case 
because drug A may actually have pharmacological effects. If drug A 
has superior pharmacological effects to drug B, then there is no 
problem: the doctor is within her rights to tell the patient that she has 
chosen drug A over drug B on the basis of pharmacological effects. 
This statement would neither be deceptive nor would it disable 
placebo effects. (Consent law does not require doctors to tell patients 
other reasons for choosing A over B so long as the doctor does not 
have a financial conflict of interest.167) But what about the harder 
case, in which the pharmacological effects favor B but the placebo 
effects and total—placebo plus pharmacological—effects favor A? 
The possibility is not remote. Malani (2006) found that placebo 
effects could reverse the ordinal ranking of drugs.168 For example, 
based solely on pharmacological effects, ranitidine (Zantac) is the top 
H2-blocker.
169 Based on the sum of pharmacological and placebo 
effects, however, Nizatidine (Axid) is the top H2-blocker.
170 With 
respect to statins, pharmacological effects suggest that lovastatin 
(Mevacor) is the second most effective statin, but accounting for 
placebo effects suggests that simvastatin (Zocor) is the second best 
statin.171 
Fortunately, and for all practical purposes, existing consent law 
likely allows doctors to choose A over B without informing patients 
that placebo effects are determinative. One reason is that most 
litigation focuses on downside risks (side effects) rather than on 
upside potential (efficacy).172 In my hypothetical, however, the doctor 
 
 166. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a lack of 
precision in a waiver of the right to sue barred enforcement under New York law). 
 167. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 158, at 328–30. 
 168. See Malani, supra note 2, at 252 tbl.6. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. The four elements of an informed consent claim are a specific risk was not disclosed, 
the doctor did not disclose that risk, the undisclosed risk materialized, the patient would not 
have consented had the risk been disclosed. See, e.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 203. Note 
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chooses A over B because of efficacy.173 Courts rarely require that 
doctors report the relative probability of success of alternative 
treatments.174 
The third question is whether a doctor may avoid nocebo effects 
by not informing a patient of a material side effect because it is a 
nocebo effect. The doctor’s motivation is that if the doctor does not 
tell the patient about the side effect, the patient will not experience 
the nocebo effect. Note that tension necessarily exists between the 
duty to inform subjects of risks and the desire to avoid nocebo effects 
only if the patient is not sensitive to placebo instructions. (This 
tension is exactly opposite from the first case of pure placebos, in 
which there is tension with informed consent only if the patient is 
sensitive to placebo instruction.175) If the patient is sensitive to 
placebo instruction, that is, the instruction will disable even nocebo 
effects, then the doctor has no excuse for withholding information 
about nocebo side effects because any ill effects can be removed by 
also informing the patient that these side effects have no 
pharmacological basis. If, however, the patient is insensitive to such 
instruction, then it might appear that the only way to avoid nocebo 
effects is for the doctor to withhold information on material risks. 
Upon closer examination, however, it is less clear there is any 
tension. First, the doctor could ask the patient whether or not the 
patient would like to hear about side effects from the proposed 
treatment. The patient might rationally say no, and thereby waive the 
right to claim a lack of informed consent. The only practical limits to 
this strategy are that many patients might still want to hear about the 
side effects and that the strategy would only reduce side effects for 
proposed treatments with worse-than-average levels of such effects. 
The explanation behind the latter limit is that even patients who are 
 
that the elements are couched in terms of undisclosed risks, not efficacy. The only context in 
which a suit is brought based on upside potential is when the doctor fails to disclose an 
alternative treatment that is better. See, e.g., id. at 210. But no case holds the doctor liable for 
not being optimistic enough about the recommended treatment if she does disclose the 
alternative treatment. 
 173. Following the logic of my discussion, if a doctor prefers A to B because B has larger 
nocebo effects, then the doctor ought to be able to disable those effects by informing the patient 
that some side effects are simply nocebo effects. I take up the case in which nocebo effects can 
only be disabled by not informing patients of those effects in the next paragraph of the main 
text. See infra text accompanying notes 175–78. 
 174. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 158, at 315 (“The probability of success . . . is rarely 
discussed by the courts.”). 
 175. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
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not informed about side effects do not believe there are no side 
effects. They believe that the drug has an average side effect profile. 
With nocebo effects, this might cause them to experience an average 
level of nocebo effects. Only if the proposed treatment has worse-
than-average side effects would revealing those effects result in more 
severe nocebo effects. 
Second, existing law may not require the doctor to reveal nocebo 
side effects.176 Recall that either medical custom or the patient’s need 
can determine which risks are material. It is possible that medical 
custom is not to reveal nocebo effects.177 Moreover, if a patient’s need 
is determined by reference to an objective standard (the “reasonable” 
patient), courts may decide that such a patient would prefer not to 
hear about side effects if hearing about it increases the probability of 
experiencing the side effect. These are big “ifs”. A skeptical judge or 
jury may dismiss evidence supporting defendants’ claims about 
custom or the reasonable patient. And in the small minority of 
jurisdictions that employ a subjective patient standard for 
materiality,178 the suit itself will suggest that the patient thought the 
information material. In these cases, a direct conflict will remain 
between existing informed consent law and prevention of nocebo 
effects. 
Because of the strong tension between existing informed consent 
law and managing expectation effects (in the context of pure placebo 
therapies and nocebo-related side effects), the following central 
normative question arises: should courts or—when constitutionally 
permitted—legislatures exempt expectation-based therapies from the 
disclosure requirements of informed consent law? The answer 
depends on the costs of an exemption. Some people will view 
nondisclosure to be a direct violation of their personal autonomy. 
Some will be concerned that doctors may abuse the privilege by 
 
 176. The therapeutic privilege exception to the requirement to reveal material risks does not 
protect a doctor’s decision not to disclose nocebo risks. That privilege generally applies only 
when the disclosure prevents the patient from making a rational decision or causes the patient 
to suffer psychological harm, not physical harm. HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 207. 
 177. Analogously, Boozang answers the first question—whether doctors may prescribe a 
placebo without revealing it to be such—by suggesting it could be custom not to reveal this 
information. Boozang, supra note 1, at 739. Under black-letter law, custom is not an effective 
defense because the treatment itself is always material. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 158, at 
311. No reference to custom is required. Only with respect to the risks from treatment is custom 
probative of materiality. 
 178. See HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 201 (noting the minority status of the subjective 
patient-centered disclosure standard). 
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prescribing placebos in the absence of evidence on placebo effects or 
by refusing to inform subjects of side effects to generate demand for 
therapies.179 It is not obvious how these concerns balance against the 
management of expectation effects.180 
One argument that counsels toward an exemption or defense 
with respect to pure placebo therapies, however, is that doctors and 
patients do not have conflicting interests. Neither wants the patient to 
get worse. Unless doctors (or their employers) are capitated with 
respect to drug costs, they have no financial incentive to prescribe 
placebo over nonplacebo medicines when the former would do less to 
promote patients’ health. To address the likely rare cases in which 
there is a conflict, courts ought to require that doctors prove they are 
not financially conflicted as a precondition for exercising the 
defense.181 In theory, a simple condition could also reduce the risk of 
abuse under an exemption for nocebo side effects: a doctor may raise 
the defense of nocebo effects to a claim of nondisclosure of material 
risks only if the doctor can demonstrate that the prescribed drug has 
nocebo effects. In practice, however, this defense is unlikely to 
facilitate optimal control of nocebo effects. For one thing, doctors are 
unlikely to have the data required to demonstrate nocebo effects. 
Moreover, if the pharmacological side effects of a drug are the same 
as the nocebo side effects, then the nocebo exemption is likely to 
interfere with disclosure of the pharmacological side effects (another 
cost to personal autonomy). Therefore, unfortunately, there is no 
completely satisfactory compromise for the tension between nocebo 
effects and patient autonomy. 
2. Fraud by Doctors.  A concern closely related to informed 
consent is whether it is fraud for a doctor to provide a placebo instead 
of actual medication. The one court which has entertained such a 
 
 179. For a general account of the relationship between personal autonomy and informed 
consent, see RUTH R. FADEN, TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & NANCY M. P. KING, A HISTORY AND 
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 7–9 (1986). 
 180. W. John Thomas notes that Thomas Percival, in his influential 1803 treatise on medical 
ethics, embraces efficacy over patient autonomy or controlling physician abuse. See Thomas, 
supra note 1, at 315 (citing THOMAS PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS; OR, A CODE OF INSTITUTES 
AND PRECEPTS, ADAPTED TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 
31–32 (Classics of Medicine Library 1985) (1803)). Thomas rejects Percival’s balancing because 
he fears it will compromise faith in pharmacologically active treatments. Id. at 345–47. 
 181. The doctor ought to have the burden because the doctor has more information on the 
financial arrangement between the doctor and the patient’s insurance plan. 
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claim said no. In Jurcich v. General Motors Corp.,182 a nurse employed 
by a company gave one of its workers sugar pills for his back pain 
without revealing that they were sugar pills.183 Although he could have 
complained about the lack of informed consent, the worker instead 
sued on a theory of fraud. The court held there was no fraud so long 
as the patient’s condition did not worsen as a result of the placebo 
therapy.184 The court also stated that the legality of employing a 
placebo therapy was more properly the subject of a medical 
malpractice suit. Its reasoning was that, according to expert 
testimony, the sugar pill would not have worked if the nurse revealed 
it to be purely placebo. Because deception was potentially ex ante 
beneficial for the worker, the better way for regulating abuse would 
be malpractice law, which would determine whether the deception as 
treatment was reasonable. 
It is possible for a future court to distinguish the Jurcich case. For 
example, the worker in Jurcich did not argue detrimental reliance, 
that is, that had he known the pill was a placebo, he would have seen 
another doctor for nonplacebo medication. A future court may also 
address a case where the payment of medical expenses was not 
covered by workers compensation, unlike in Jurcich, or health 
insurance and thus a pecuniary loss for purposes of a fraud action.185 
Finally, a future court might not find persuasive an expert’s view that 
placebo effects are real and that placebo instructions diffuse placebo 
effects. Nevertheless, the Jurcich view that malpractice law ought to 
judge the prescription of placebos186 seems correct. Fraud law requires 
that the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss. Because the only recipient 
of the plaintiff’s money could be the doctor, this element requires that 
the doctor financially benefited from using a placebo. Except in the 
peculiar case in which the doctor has a financial interest in prescribing 
a placebo,187 deception concerning placebo effects does not benefit the 
doctor. As the Jurcich court implied about the worker in that case,188 
some patients have psychosomatic disorders that can only be cured by 
 
 182. Jurcich v. Gen. Motors Corp., 539 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
 183. Id. at 598–600. 
 184. Id. at 601. 
 185. See id. at 601–02. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Ironically, Jurcich may be such a case. The employer arguably benefited when the 
nurse employee prescribed a sugar pill rather than a more expensive prescription medication 
because the employer paid for the worker’s medical expenses. 
 188. Jurcich, 539 S.W.2d at 600. 
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placebo. In such patients, just as in patients with psychological 
ailments, traditional models of consent, and thus fraud, may have 
little relevance. 
3. Medical Malpractice.  The logical question that follows is how 
medical malpractice law should accommodate expectation effects. 
The answer is: no differently than malpractice law accommodates 
pharmacological effects. The issue in malpractice cases is whether a 
doctor’s treatment of a patient was negligent. The answer hinges, not 
on how a treatment works, but whether it works. Nor does medical 
malpractice impose theoretical limitations on the nature of treatments 
it can evaluate. It is equally comfortable judging physically 
noninvasive psychotherapy as it is judging prescription of an 
antibiotic. The expectation component of therapies simply mixes a 
psychological intervention (manipulation of expectations) with a 
physical intervention (prescription of a sugar pill or otherwise 
complementary medication). The test for negligence is the same in all 
cases: does the treatment conform to medical custom, or, would a 
reasonable physician administer this treatment?189 
This is not to say that malpractice litigants and courts would find 
it easy to accommodate placebo effects in their cases. The difficulty, 
however, would be with proving causation, not with setting the 
standard of care. Consider a case in which a patient sues a physician 
for employing a therapy for its purported placebo effects even 
though, the patient contends, a reasonable physician would not have. 
The patient would have to demonstrate that the treatment had no 
placebo effects, whereas the physician would respond with evidence 
that it did. Both would rely on expert opinion. The complication is 
that medical experts know little about placebo effects. It is not the 
norm for, say, drug companies to investigate the expectation-related 
effects of their treatments. Without more research on which 
treatments have placebo effects, it will be hard to find true experts on 
the matter and thus hard to reach informed legal judgments about 
what constitutes negligent use or nonuse of placebo therapies. 
Therefore, it will be some time before placebo effects become grist 
for malpractice suits. 
Before concluding, I should highlight two other areas of health 
law that may be impacted by placebo effects. The first concerns the 
 
 189. See, e.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 289–90. 
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rules governing consent to participate in medical research. The 
second concerns the rules governing which treatments are covered by 
government-run health plans such as Medicaid. I do not provide a 
separate treatment of these topics because my analysis would largely 
track earlier discussions. The issues raised by consent for human-
subjects research are similar to those raised by consent for treatment. 
The issues raised by drug coverage decisions are analogous to issues 
raised by the FDA drug approval process. 
C. Consumer Protection Law 
Consider a hypothetical based on the facts of FTC v. QT, Inc.,190 
a false advertising case decided by the Seventh Circuit.191 The 
defendant produces a simple brass bracelet with no known 
pharmacological effects.192 Nonetheless, the defendant represents to 
consumers that the bracelet cures lower back pain.193 A consumer who 
purchases the bracelet but experiences no reduction in back pain 
could sue the defendant for common law fraud or under state 
consumer protection law. Alternatively, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) could sue—and in QT did—alleging violations of 
Sections 5(a) and 12(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.194 The 
former prohibits “unfair or deceptive” trade practices broadly195 and 
the latter targets false advertising in particular.196 The central element 
in all these claims is that the defendant made a representation that 
had no reasonable basis or that it knew was false.197 In response, the 
defendant may assert a defense of “puffery,” which protects certain 
boastful but unsupported claims by defendants.198 
Research on placebo effects raises two questions about how 
consumer protection law ought to handle this fact pattern. First, 
should the defendant be allowed to claim that its bracelet cures pain 
in order to generate expectations that might trigger placebo effects 
 
 190. FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 191. Id. at 858. 
 192. Id. at 861. 
 193. Id. at 860–61. 
 194. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52(a) (2006). 
 195. Id. § 45(a). 
 196. Id. § 52(a). 
 197. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE 
LAW § 2:9, at 41 (2007) (common law fraud); id. § 3:9, at 124–26 (state consumer protection 
statutes); id. § 10:3, at 769 (Federal Trade Commission Act). 
 198. See id. § 2:17, at 68–71. 
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from its product? In other words, should the defendant be allowed to 
employ advertising to create placebo effects? Second, assuming the 
bracelet already has placebo effects, should the defendant be able to 
claim that the bracelet reduces pain, even though it has no 
pharmacological effect? 
Existing law has well-settled answers to these questions. The 
defendant cannot claim the bracelet cures pain in order to generate 
placebo effects. Such a claim without prior reasonable basis is false 
advertising. Puffery is no defense. Puffery protects nonfactual claims, 
that is, claims that cannot be falsified under existing science.199 But the 
defendant’s claim is factual: whether the bracelet ameliorates pain 
can be verified by either straightforward observational or 
experimental study. Even if the defendant did not sell its product 
until there was evidence of placebo effects (as was partly the 
defendant’s claim in QT200), it cannot advertise that its product 
reduces pain. Several courts, most notably the Ninth Circuit in FTC v. 
Pantron I Corp.,201 have held that advertising a product is effective on 
the basis of placebo effects is “misleading” because the product is not 
“inherently effective, its results being attributable to the 
psychosomatic effect produced by . . . advertising and marketing.”202 
But are these the right answers? Consider, first, therapeutic 
claims made to generate placebo effects. Whether the existing law has 
it right depends on whether nonfalsifiable or vague claims can 
generate placebo effects. If so, then the defendant’s therapeutic 
claims produce no better health outcomes than mere puffery would 
have, and the approach under the law does not reduce welfare. 
Unfortunately, the literature on placebo effects does not indicate 
 
 199. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 
1402–03 (2006). 
 200. See FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 201. FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 202. Id. at 1100 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. An Article . . . ACU-
DOT . . . , 483 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (N.D. Ohio 1980)); see also QT, Inc., 512 F.3d at 863; An 
Article . . . ACU-DOT . . . , 483 F. Supp. at 1315 (“This Court resists the impulse to allow 
claimant to market a product that works only by means of a placebo effect on the basis that it 
nevertheless often achieves a relief of pain as claimed. . . . [T]he claims are inherently 
misleading.”); T-UP, Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 801 A.2d 173, 185–86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2002) (“[W]e are dealing with the advertising of purported cures or treatments for life-
threatening diseases. . . . [A] reasonable basis for such product claims requires at least two 
adequate, well-controlled, double-blinded clinical studies.”). But see QT, Inc., 512 F.3d at 863 
(expressing skepticism of Pantron I’s view that placebo effects are always worthless to 
consumers, but not deciding the issue because the defendant made false claims in addition to 
claiming placebo effects). 
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whether a nonfalsifiable or vague claim can generate the same 
placebo effects as its complement. The only serious study on placebo 
effects from advertising, by Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely, found placebo 
effects but employed readily testable claims about their energy drink 
treatment.203 
The right answer will also depend on whether there are hidden 
costs to generating placebo effects through otherwise unsupported 
claims about therapeutic value. For example, is there detrimental 
reliance in that consumers purchase the advertised product with 
placebo effects instead of another product with superior 
pharmacological effects?204 Alternatively, do artificially generated 
placebo effects cause consumers to direct their energies (behaviorally 
or physiologically) to complement an otherwise useless product 
rather than one that will make better use of that energy? In other 
words, do pure placebos produce smaller placebo effects, per unit, of 
a consumer’s energy than pharmacologically active therapies with 
placebo effects? Again, existing research does not answer this 
question. 
In the interim, a reasonable compromise might be to allow the 
defendant a defense that its claim generated placebo effects. The 
defendant would bear the burden of demonstrating that, after it 
began advertising, its product began having placebo effects. This 
claim could be demonstrated just as a drug company might estimate 
the placebo effects of a new drug, for example, with an unblinded 
experiment or an observational study. The plaintiff could dispute the 
evidence by asserting that the defendant inadequately controlled for 
selection bias. Courts already have experience with such factual 
disputes.205 
This defense is incompatible with existing law’s stance that 
claiming a product is effective based merely on prior evidence of 
 
 203. See Shiv et al., supra note 103, at 390. The study found increased placebo effects when 
participants were presented with instructions that read, “Drinks such as SoBe have been shown 
to improve mental functioning, resulting in improved performance on tasks such as solving 
puzzles. In fact, the Web site of SoBe includes references to over 50 scientific studies suggesting 
that consuming drinks like SoBe can significantly improve mental functioning . . . .” Id. 
 204. Detrimental reliance does not block a firm from advertising a product with known 
pharmacological effects even though such advertising might cause consumers to choose its 
product rather than a competitor’s superior product. 
 205. See, e.g., State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1157 (Me. 1988) (holding that selection bias 
impaired the validity of an expert’s testimony on sexual abuse because “[n]o comparison testing 
was done with children who were not victims of sexual abuse”). 
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placebo effects is misleading because it is the advertising, not the 
physical product, that generates those effects. But it is wrong-headed 
to forego valuable placebo effects simply because they are not 
“inherent[]” in a given product.206 The fact that any physical substance 
can generate the same placebo effects reflects a misunderstanding of 
the consumer good that is being produced. That good is the placebo 
effect itself. A physical substance, whether a bracelet or a pill, is 
simply an input into this good. The fact that any physical substance 
can suffice just means there are fewer barriers to entry into the 
market for the production of placebo effects. By most accounts, lower 
barriers to entry are a good thing. A rule that quashes advertising 
based on placebo effects bars the promotion of—or at least artificially 
raises the price of—an otherwise valuable product. Without a better 
argument, Pantron I and its ilk should be overruled on this point.207 
D. Tort Law 
In this Section, I consider the implications of placebo effects for 
tort law and fault-based compensation regimes, such as workers’ 
compensation, intended to displace common law torts. I cannot 
emphasize enough that this analysis is more speculative than that of 
fields previously examined because there is virtually no evidence of 
nocebo effects outside the medical-therapeutic context. Even in the 
therapeutic context the evidence is limited to a few treatments and 
the clinical trial context. This absence of evidence implies there is 
little basis for litigating such effects in tort suits. I do not treat the 
absence of such evidence, however, as completely obviating the need 
for discussion of tort in this Article because there is a sense, at least in 
the defense bar, that many litigated injuries are psychosomatic.208 
 
 206. See An Article . . . ACU-DOT . . . , 483 F. Supp. at 1315 (emphasis omitted). 
 207. Perhaps one could argue that belief itself is a finite commodity. For example, if the 
defendant in QT, Inc. convinced a consumer that its bracelet reduced pain, the consumer would 
be less likely in an absolute sense to believe that, say, a pharmacologically active analgesic 
reduced pain. Not only is there no evidence for this view, but it is not even a recognized theory 
about the production of belief. 
 208. See, e.g., Sol Bobst, Toxic Mold as a Misnomer, COLUMNS—MOLD, Nov. 2005, at 2, 3 
available at http://www.harrismartin.com/pdfs/article/Article6213.pdf; James K. Archibald, 
Venable LLP, The Nocebo Effect (1997), http://www.venable.com/publications.cfm?action= 
view&publication_id= 366&publication_type_id=2; see also Jeff Nesbit, Evil Twin of ‘Placebo 
Effect’ Merits More Serious Study, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at B7 (asserting that the nocebo 
effect may be responsible for injuries associated with silicon breast implants, side effects 
associated with the fat-substitute Olestra, and Gulf War syndrome). 
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1. Is the Defendant at All Responsible? The Distinction between 
Somatoform Injuries and Nocebo Effects.  It is not surprising, then, 
that defendants have repeatedly asserted as a defense that purported 
injuries have psychological causes for which the defendant is not 
responsible.209 For example, in Okafor v. Best Buy,210 the claimant 
slipped on a wet floor and suffered injuries to her back, leg, and 
hand.211 After some months, the company petitioned the state’s 
industrial accident board for permission to terminate the claimant’s 
workers’ compensation benefits based on a physician’s testimony that 
many of the claimant’s symptoms were psychosomatic.212 The board 
granted the petition and a trial court upheld the board’s decision as 
based on substantial evidence.213 In Lee v. Secretary of the Department 
of Health and Human Services,214 the petitioner complained that a 
hepatitis B vaccine caused her to suffer fibromyalgia, a chronic pain 
disorder.215 She sought compensation under the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program, and the government suggested that 
her pain was likely due to a nocebo effect.216 The U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims rejected the defense because, among other things, the 
government’s expert was a rheumatologist, not a psychologist.217 In 
these cases, the defendant asserted a psychosomatic origin for the 
plaintiff’s injury to defeat causation, though one can imagine that 
assertion might also be used to support arguments for comparative 
negligence or failure to mitigate. 
An important source of confusion in these cases is the distinction 
between nocebo effects or psychosomatic injury, on one hand, and 
somatoform disorder, on the other. Courts often use these terms 
 
 209. A Westlaw search for psychosomatic, nocebo, or placebo effect, limiting cases to those 
concerning tort, workers’ compensation, or other compensation systems, yields over 500 hits. 
The precise search was “((psychosomat! “placebo effect” nocebo) & (“disability benefits” 
compensation “industrial commission” tort! neglig! auto!) % (malpractice mislabel! “false 
advertising” “Federal Trade Commission” “F.T.C.”))” in the Allcases database. There were 670 
hits on August 28, 2008. 
 210. Okafor v. Best Buy, No. 05A-07-002 JTV, 2006 WL 2997480 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 
2006). 
 211. Id. at *1. 
 212. Id. at *2–3. 
 213. Id. at *4–5. 
 214. Lee v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-2479V, 2005 WL 1125672 
(Fed. Cl. May 6, 2005). 
 215. Id. at *1. 
 216. Id. at *11. 
 217. Id. at *15. 
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interchangeably. But they describe different phenomena. 
Somatoform disorder is the existence of physical symptoms without 
evidence of physical disease.218 It implies nothing about cause. A 
diagnosis of psychosomatic injury is one which attributes the 
symptoms to a psychological trigger, but not necessarily 
expectation.219 In colloquial use, either expectation of injury or desire 
for the consequences of injury (compensation or medical and familial 
attention) can be the motivation. A nocebo effect is an injury 
triggered, at least in part, by the plaintiff’s expectation of injury from 
the defendant’s action. In all three cases, the injury is genuine. But 
the implications for tort differ. Somatoform disorder can be thought 
of as a psychological ailment, like depression, and for this reason is 
compensable in tort, subject to the usual limits on compensation for 
infliction of emotional distress.220 The harm from psychosomatic 
disorder is likewise compensable, but because it suggests that the 
plaintiff’s mental state is an origin for injury, it tends to undercut the 
plaintiff’s claim that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries or to 
support a defendant’s comparative negligence or mitigation claims.221 
The same can be said for the nocebo effect, which is merely a special 
case of psychosomatic injury. 
2. Who Is Primarily Responsible for the Harm?  To fully 
understand the implications of nocebo effects for tort, it is best to 
start from first principles rather than existing case law. Nocebo effects 
pose a problem for torts because they raise the possibility that there 
are two causes of a plaintiff’s injury: the defendant’s negligent action 
and the plaintiff’s unreasonable expectation of harm from the 
defendant’s action. The central question is to whom one ought to 
assign responsibility for the incremental harm from the plaintiff’s 
unreasonable expectation. (A secondary—though no less vexing—
 
 218. See Robert C. Smith & Francesca C. Dwamena, Classification and Diagnosis of Patients 
with Medically Unexplained Symptoms, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 685, 686 (2007) (defining 
various types of somatoform disorder). 
 219. See Somatoform Disorders, Merck Manual Home Edition (2008), http://www.merck. 
com/mmhe/sec07/ch099/ch099a.html (“[T]he term [psychosomatic] was once used to refer to 
physical symptoms that appear to be caused or worsened by mental factors, rather than by a 
physical disorder.”). 
 220. See, e.g., Bahura v. S.E.W. Investors, 754 A.2d 928, 939 (D.C. App. 2000) (holding that 
multiple chemical sensitivity disorder from air pollution at EPA headquarters is a compensable 
injury). 
 221. But see Wasiak v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 568 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Neb. 1997) (finding 
that somatization might result from an auto accident caused by the defendant). 
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question is how to determine the magnitude of the damages from 
unreasonable expectations.) To the extent that they are subject to the 
control of the plaintiff, nocebo effects may not require any 
fundamental changes because tort law already has doctrines such as 
comparative negligence and mitigation to handle victim precaution. 
These doctrines would transfer losses back to the plaintiff when the 
plaintiff fails to avoid unreasonable nocebo effects. In general, I 
predict research will show that nocebo effects are controllable if they 
are a behavioral phenomenon rather than a physiological 
phenomenon, based on the logic that individuals do not have control 
over internal physiological processes such as immune response or 
other hormone production. If I am correct, then evidentiary conflict 
should focus, not only on whether the defendant’s action and the 
plaintiff’s injury are subject to nocebo effects, but whether those 
effects have a predominantly physiological mechanism or not. 
Although existing doctrines governing victim precaution provide 
some structure for how tort law might manage controllable placebo 
effects, they do not fully determine the appropriate response. Those 
doctrines are premised on being able to identify what is “reasonable” 
behavior by the victim. Reasonableness is a ubiquitous standard in 
tort, but it does not have a single, consistent meaning in all contexts. 
With respect to nocebo effects, for instance, it is not obvious what for 
the plaintiff constitutes a reasonable expectation of harm. A 
common-sense view might be that reasonable here means “correct.” 
For instance, a person’s expectations about the pharmacological 
effect of the defendant’s action or product are reasonable if they are 
correct. An action can have a pharmacological effect. For example, a 
defendant pollutes your drinking water with toxic chemicals. 
Conversely, under a reasonable-expectation standard for, say, 
comparative negligence, a defendant ought to be liable only for the 
portion of damages that would remain if the plaintiff’s expectations 
had been correct. The common-sense view, however, is not 
necessarily the efficient view. The Hand formula,222 or at least a 
sophisticated version of it, would suggest balancing the marginal cost 
to the plaintiff of controlling expectations against the marginal 
benefit in terms of reducing the injury.223 This standard may lead, 
 
 222. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 223. Even in the product liability context, in which there is strict liability for, for example, 
failure to warn, the specific dangers that the defendant must broadcast—those the defendant 
knew or should have known—are judged by a reasonableness standard. See RICHARD A. 
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however, to counterintuitive results: requiring the plaintiff to expect 
that the defendant’s action or product is perfectly safe (if there are 
nocebo effects and expectations are very easy to manipulate) or that 
it is completely dangerous (if the product has inverse placebo effects 
rather than nocebo effects). Such complexity may make an efficiency-
driven standard difficult for juries to grasp. The result could be 
erroneous decisions. Indeed, it may well be that the costs of 
implementing an efficient standard—including the risk of jury error—
outweigh the productivity gains from such a standard. For the 
remainder of the discussion, I assume this is true and simply assume 
reasonable expectations are correct expectations.224 
The analysis changes if the plaintiff cannot control nocebo 
effects.225 The problem then resembles the case of joint tortfeasors. A 
first defendant contributes, say, a dangerous product, and a second 
defendant contributes information that causes the plaintiff to have 
unreasonable expectations of the harm from the product. One 
difficulty is identifying the second defendant. The plaintiff may not 
even be able to identify the source of the information about the first 
defendant’s product. Even if the plaintiff did know the source, there 
may be multiple possible sources of that information. Another 
difficulty is that the second defendant may be effectively immune 
from suit. For example, if the source is the press, the First 
Amendment protects it from liability for generating unreasonable 
expectations. Although product disparagement is actionable, due to 
free speech concerns it is limited to cases involving actual malice.226 In 
practice, this scienter requirement almost always prevents courts from 
assigning any nocebo liability to the press. Alternatively, the source of 
the plaintiff’s information may be the plaintiff’s attorney. But 
attorney-client communications are not admissible in federal court227 
 
EPSTEIN, TORTS § 16.12.2, at 418 (1999). Moreover, mitigation, which may limit damages even 
when the defendant’s liability is strict, is subject to a reasonable-choice standard. See id. § 17.7, 
at 448. 
 224. This is not to say it is easy to determine what the plaintiff’s expectation was or what the 
correct expectation is. But those more technical topics are better suited to an in-depth analysis 
of placebo effects in tort rather than an overview like this Article. 
 225. Under an efficiency standard, this paragraph applies when it is more costly to plaintiffs 
to control their expectations than it is for the source of the plaintiffs’ expectations to regulate 
the flow of information to the plaintiffs. 
 226. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502, 510–13 (1984). 
 227. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (incorporating common law principles of privilege into the 
Federal Rules of Evidence). 
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and are admissible only in limited situations in most state courts.228 
Although the legal authority for the attorney-client privilege is 
statutory, there may be federal constitutional hurdles, namely, due 
process or the right to counsel, that limit exceptions to the rule in 
order to allow proof of causation in a nocebo suit.229 
If the incremental losses due to expectations cannot practically 
be assigned to the second defendant, the question arises: should they 
be assigned to the first defendant or to the plaintiff? When the 
dangers from the first defendant’s action and the nocebo effects from 
unreasonable expectations about that action are of the same type, as 
when nocebo effects exacerbate the side effects of a drug product, 
joint and several liability may apply. The rationale is that when 
damages cannot be easily apportioned among defendants, the 
residual losses ought to fall not on the plaintiff but on the available 
defendant because, among other things, the injured plaintiff must be 
adequately compensated for his or her loss.230 Many states, however, 
abandoned joint and several liability in the 1980s due to concerns 
about inequitable allocations to defendants who contributed only 
slightly to the plaintiff’s injury.231 In these states, one might be 
tempted to apply the eggshell skull rule:232 that defendants take 
plaintiffs as defendants find them. In the nocebo context, this would 
mean that the defendant bears the risk that plaintiffs have 
unreasonable expectations. The problem with applying the eggshell 
skull rule to nocebo effects, however, is that the rule applies to 
preexisting conditions of the plaintiff and not to injuries caused by 
unreachable codefendants. That leaves states with mere several 
liability—as well as states that would revisit joint and several liability 
in the case of nocebo claims—at the original question: should the 
nocebo losses fall on the first defendant or the plaintiff? My sense is 
 
 228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. d (2000) 
(“In most of the states, the [attorney-client] privilege is defined by statute or rule . . . .”). 
 229. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that 
the government violated the Constitution by requiring an accounting firm, KPMG, to cease 
paying legal fees for its indicted employees). 
 230. See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 205 (Ill. 1983) (“Elimination of joint 
and several liability would work a serious and unwarranted deleterious effect on the ability of 
an injured plaintiff to obtain adequate compensation for his injuries.”). 
 231. For a survey, see Anup Malani & Charles Mullin, Assessing the Merits of Reallocation 
Under Joint and Several Liability, with an Application to Asbestos Litigation (Univ. of Va. Law 
Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 18, 2005), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=uvalwps. 
 232. See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wisc. 1891). 
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that the proper answer is to assign additional losses from even 
unreasonable expectations to the available defendant.233 The reason is 
that, although plaintiffs cannot control their exposure to 
unreasonable information about the harm from the first defendant’s 
action, that defendant may be in a good position to counteract that 
information with positive spin—some call it simple advertising—
about the safety of its actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is to review the scientific literature on 
placebo effects and begin a discussion of possible implications for 
legal regulation. First, it argues that the FDA should either correct 
bias from placebo effects in estimating whether a drug is 
pharmacologically effective or should credit placebo and nocebo 
effects in making judgments about whether a drug is safe and 
effective enough to market. Second, this Article contends that the law 
should allow placebo effects as a defense to claims that a doctor did 
not obtain informed consent from a patient or a company falsely 
advertised that its (pharmacologically inert) product had a health 
benefit. Finally, placebo effects complicate tort law. Fortunately, 
much of the trouble can be managed using existing doctrines of 
comparative negligence and mitigation. 
My discussion of placebo effects is not intended to be exhaustive. 
Indeed, there are some important legal fields and questions it has not 
touched. For example, in administrative law, is it arbitrary and 
capricious for an agency to consider placebo effects in its 
decisionmaking? In contract law, can placebo effects be the basis for 
consideration or even expectation damages? In the interstice between 
contract and tort, ought it to be actionable as tortious inference with a 
business relationship to say that a competitor’s product is a pure 
placebo? (Relatedly, in First Amendment law, do proven expectation 
effects alter the level of protection afforded commercial, and even 
perhaps noncommercial, speech?) Finally, in libel, can nocebo effects 
count as harm to the plaintiff? In many of these cases, the analysis 
will follow the same pathways it does when considering the impact of 
placebo effects on drug law, health law, consumer protection law or 
tort law. 
 
 233. To be clear, the first defendant should in any state be assigned losses from its product 
assuming the plaintiff has reasonable expectations. 
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Therefore, it is useful to conclude with a summary of open 
research questions that will pin down legal reforms in those areas. 
First, how prevalent are expectation effects? Specifically, do placebo 
or nocebo effects attach to therapies outside the clinical trial context? 
The answer is relevant to whether the law of informed consent should 
permit doctors to omit mention of certain side effects and whether the 
FDA ought to consider expectation effects in its approval decisions. 
Relatedly, do nocebo effects operate outside the therapeutic context? 
This question is relevant to whether expectation effects impact tort 
law. Second, can pure placebos have placebo effects? Do they require 
specific instructions about health benefits? The answer to the first 
query impacts whether informed consent has to deal with pure 
placebo prescriptions and whether consumer protection law ought to 
overturn Pantron I and accommodate claims of placebo efficacy. In 
addition, the answer to the second query impacts whether the FDA 
must confront the awkward decision to approve a pure placebo. 
Third, do placebo or nocebo instructions disable placebo or nocebo 
effects, respectively? If so, then both drug law and informed consent 
law may have to live with asymmetric approaches to placebo and 
nocebo effects. Fourth, can individuals control either the beliefs that 
generate nocebo effects or the consequences that flow from these 
beliefs? The answer will determine which doctrines in tort ought to 
govern allocating losses from nocebo effects. Fifth, what are the 
hidden costs of generating expectation effects? Does it foster 
detrimental reliance on therapies that are overall less effective? Does 
it generally reduce faith in conventional medicine? If these costs are 
severe, then drug law and consumer protection law should be 
cautious about crediting claims of expectation effects. Finally, to what 
extent does patient self-selection in its many forms—the decision to 
participate in a trial, choice of treatment in a study, choice of 
simultaneous treatment outside the study, and attrition from a 
study—affect estimates of treatment effects in studies attempting to 
estimate placebo effects? Because externally valid estimates are 
necessary to value placebo effects, self-selection may lead to 
suboptimal legal regulation of these such effects. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1.  Definitions of Placebo and Nocebo Effects. 
Does the patient think the therapy will 
produce superior or inferior health 
outcomes?  
Superior Inferior 
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Figure 1.  Figure 4 from Pollo et al. (2001). 
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Figure 3.  Price and Advertising Results from Shiv, Carmon,  
and Ariely (2005). 
 
MALANI IN FINAL2.DOC 11/16/2008  9:52:18 PM 
472 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:411 
Figure 4.  Estimation of Pharmacological Effect in  
H2-Blocker Trials. 
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